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LEGAL GUARDIANS: ISLAMIC LAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW,
AND THE SALMAN RUSHDIE AFFAIR
Anthony Chase*
"When the word is important, the guardian of the word becomes impor-
tant."
-Farrukh Dhondy
"Who will guard the guardians?"
INTRODUCTION
Reactions to the Imam Khomeini's fatwa' on Salman Rushdie are
a mirror reflecting observers' predilections and prejudices. For some, the
fatwa is a case study of Islam's fierce intolerance. For others, the fatwa
* PhD candidate, The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy. The author would
like to thank Professors Hurst Hannum and Al Rubin of The Fletcher School for their
invaluable comments; Sandra Colliver, Law Programme Director of "Article 19," for
her generous time and assistance; Professor Frank Vogel of Harvard Law School for
kindly providing sources; and Dr. Muhammad H. al-Shela of the al-Furat Center in
Cairo for his comments and discussion.
1. See CYRIL GLAsSE, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMt (1989) (defining
the Islamic term fatwa as a "published opinion or decision regarding religious doctrine
or law made by a recognized authority"). Khomeini's farwa, issued on February 14,
1989, reads as follows:
To God we belong and to Him we shall return. I inform all zealous
Muslims of the world that the author of The Satanic Verses-which has been
compiled, printed, and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet, and the
Qur'an--and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its content
are sentenced to death.
I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they
may be found, so that no one else will dare to insult the sacred beliefs of
Muslims. Whoever is killed on this path is a martyr. In addition, anyone who
has access to the author of this book, but is not able to carry out his execu-
tion, should inform someone else so that the punishment may be executed.
Translation of fatwa provided by author.
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is a response to the United States and Europe's cultural aggression,
which holds nothing above ironic scorn and base insults.2 Such high-
pitched histrionics obscure some of the ambiguities and subtleties at the
center of this affair. Perhaps it is not necessary to condemn Rushdie to
death in order to condemn his book, nor is it necessary to condemn
Islam in order to condemn Khomeini's fatwa. In the intricacies of this
situation lie crisscrossing areas of shared interests and norms which, if
explored, may erode notions that the Rushdie affair represents an inevi-
table clash, rather than a particular constellation of legal and political
circumstance. It may also show, however, the latent potential which,
given such a constellation of circumstance, can result in the eruption of
particularly extreme interpretations of religious law which conflict and
clash with other legal and political orders.
Equally fundamental is that this "constellation," however particular,
may also tell us something about recurring-if usually less
acute-tensions between spiritual and temporal orders of authority. One
of the eternal questions of politics is how to reconcile a religious
order's absolutes with complex temporal realities.3 The Rushdie affair is
a particularly interesting case study of this question, reflecting both
domestic and international political tensions, each of which is sharpened
by Iran's difficult relations with the international legal order. Both the
Iranian Islamic and international legal orders share an ambiguous basis
in natural and positive law which makes them internally quite intricate,
and their interrelations all the more complex to reconcile. By extending
2. See generally SACRILEGE VERSUS CIVILrrY: MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES ON THE
SATANIC VERSES AFFAIR chs. 3 & 4 (M.M. Ahsan & A.R. Kidawi eds., 1991) [here-
inafter SACRILEGE VERSUS CIVILITY] (chronicling Western reaction to Khomeini's
fatwa and providing arguments from a critical Muslim perspective regarding The Sa-
tanic Verses); THE RUSHDIE FILE ch. 5 (Lisa Appignanesi & Sara Maitland eds.,
1990) (compiling reaction from all perspectives to the Rushdie affair); MUHAMMAD
YAHYAA, AL-AYAAT AL-SHAYTAANIYA [The Satanic Verses] (1990) (offering a critical
analysis of The Satanic Verses); ALI MAZRUI, THE SATANIC VERSES, OR A SATANIC
NovEL? (1989) (denouncing Rushdie and explaining Muslim sensitivity); SADIQ JALAL
AL-AZM, DHIHNIYYAT AL-TAHRIIM [The Mental Taboo] (1992) (giving a balanced and
penetrating analysis of the Rushdie affair); DANIEL EASTERMAN, NEW JERUSALEMS
(1992) (collecting short pieces on Islam with a particular focus on the Rushdie affair);
RICHARD WEBSTER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY (1990) (criticizing Western
hypocrisy towards Muslims); MUNAWAR ANEES, THE KISS OF JUDAS: AFFAIRS OF A
BROWN SAHIB (1989) (attacking Salman Rushdie).
3. See Said Amir Arjomand, Religion and Constitutionalism in Western History
and in Modern Iran and Pakistan, in THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF RELIGION 70
(1993) (reflecting on particular dimensions of this historic tension).
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its reach into the "internal" politics of states, international human rights
law adds yet another layer of complexity to the interplay between these
two orders.
Unfortunately, the Rushdie affair is often reduced to strict dichoto-
mies: Islam vs. the West; Islamic law vs. international law; cultural
relativism vs. universal human rights; divine natural law vs. positive
law; a religious order vs. a secular world; medieval laws vs. the right of
free expression; the traditional vs. the modem; the community vs. the
individual; the globalization of international structures vs. the fragmenta-
tion of cultural identities. Each of these dichotomies reduces great and
complex traditions to their pale shadows. "Western" traditions, for exam-
ple, are extremely diverse-including threads which are quite censori-
ous-and are also informed by deeply religious roots, communitarian
impulses, and non-Western sources. The contemporary Islamic world is,
of course, very much a product of a religious tradition-conflicting and
contested as it is-but it is also a product of diverse cultural contexts
and continuing interactions with other orders of law and society. The
complexities of these orders, their interactions, and even elements of
hybridity, not only complicate looking at the Rushdie affair in terms of
strict dichotomies, they also bring into question the notion that the secu-
lar international legal order and Islamic law are in opposition to each
other. In fact, though distinct, it may well be that the Rushdie affair
reveals their fundamental similarities as much as it does their differenc-
es. While these dichotomies frame any analysis of the Rushdie affair, it
is only by deconstructing them that one can get to the heart of the
issues they raise.4
4. See, e.g., Ann E. Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of
Cultures or a Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L 307 (1994) [hereinafter
A Clash of Cultures] (arguing that Islam is not static, but rather part of complex
societies and perfectly able to incorporate human rights principles); M.H.A. Reisman,
Some Reflections on Human Rights and Clerical Claims to Political Power, 19 YALE
J. INT'L L. 509 (1994) (looking at whether religious groups that exercise their
freedom of religion do so in violation of other of the secular world's human rights);
Ann E. Mayer, Religious Law and Legal Pluralism, 12 CARDOZO L RLV. 1015
(1991) (examining the problems associated with adjusting the Islamic legacy to fit the
context of modem state systems); Sarvenoz Bahar, Khomeinism, The Islamic Republic
of Iran, and International Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33
HARV. INT'L L. J. 145 (1992) (noting the tension between the global unification of
technology, economy, and society, and the development of a more representative set
of diverse global actors); ANN E. MAYER, ISLAht AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1991) (laying
out the fundamental tensions between the two orders); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources
of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human Rights in the Islamic Criminal Justice
19961
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This affair raises the key issue of who has authority to speak and
define law with legitimacy in the religious, political, and legal orders.
Indeed, perhaps not coincidentally, this is also a central theme of
Rushdie's novel, which irreverently asks if Islam's founding authority is
based on an angel or a devil, a befuddled divinity or a corrupt man.5
As the Rushdie affair shows, the spiritual and temporal orders' battle
over authority is increasingly intersecting with the international order.6
Art is powerful competition to the power of the divine word. The
Satanic Verses is easily perceived as an obscene and mocking insult
which seeks to undermine the authority of Islam's founder and its
founding text. Distrust of The Satanic Verses' form and style may well
have contributed to the reactions that it produced.7 What was perhaps
System, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1982) (regarding the potential of
an Islamic criminal justice system to practice and protect human rights principles);
Bernard Lewis, Behind the Rushdie Affair, in AMERICAN SCHOLAR (1991) (seeing the
essence of Rushdie's fatwa in Islamic notions of heresy).
5. See SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1992).
6. Signs of official Jewish and Christian support for Muslim outrage at The
Satanic Verses-albeit short of support for the death sentence itself-may be indica-
tive of a broader tension between sacred and secularizing forces which extends be-
yond particular spiritual and temporal orders. The Chief Rabbis of both Israel and
Britain, for example, each protested against the publication of The Satanic Verses. See
LONDON TiMES, Mar. 9, 1989, in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 2 (reporting British
Chief Rabbi Jakobovits stated "we should not tolerate a form of denigration and
ridicule which can only breed resentment to the point of hatred"); see also Vatican:
Newspaper Condemns Rushdie's Novel, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 6, 1989 (noting the
Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano, condemned The Satanic Verses as blasphe-
mous). Even evangelist Billy Graham expressed his sympathy for British Muslim
protests. THE GUARDIAN, June 2, 1989, in Tim RUsHDIE FILE, supra note 2. On a
different subject, the recent Cairo World Conference on Population and the preparatory
meetings for the Beijing World Conference on Women showed a similarly broad and
vigorous coalition of outlook among the major religions. Although religious orders
may feel increasingly ostracized by mainstream orders of political and legal authority,
these meetings indicated that nowhere in the world is religion (or "God") as dead a
social force as some proclaim.
7. Distrust between art and religion is not new in the Islamic world. Sacralized
poetry was intimately affiliated with the pre-Islamic order overturned by Muhammad,
and has been looked upon ever since with suspicion. The Qur'an says "[als for poets,
the erring follow them. Hast thou not seen how they stray in every valley. And how
they say that which they do not." Sura 26:224-26, reprinted in AHMED ALl, A-
QUR'AN: A CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION (1988) (source of all Qur'anic cites for
this article). This suspicion recognizes that poetry and art are powerful competition, to
the power and force of the divine word. Of course, in a classic contradiction, the
Qur'an, despite the fact that theologically it is inimitable and so is not, strictly speak-
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more shocking to South Asian Muslims, who as a group had the most
heated popular reaction to the book, was that The Satanic Verses was
written by another South Asian Muslim, an insider and thus a perceived
traitor.' What was shocking for Rushdie, the British Government, and
much of the rest of the world was that Khomeini's fanva broke the
international legal order's established confines and the assumed borders
between religious and secular law. It did this by arbitrarily claiming the
authority to extend the enforcement jurisdiction of a putatively religious
verdict into British domestic, secular jurisdiction.'
There are two fundamental issues in the Rushdie affair. Khomeini's
fatwa and the more general outrage of many Muslims against The Sa-
tanic Verses. This outrage, though heated, most often distinguished be-
tween righteous anger and endorsement of the fatwa. This paper focuses
on the fatwa. By examining its legitimacy in three different orders: the
Islamic legal order, the secular international legal order, and the Iranian
domestic political order, one can catch glimpses of some of the
oppositions and similarities among these orders, as well as the intertwin-
ing and often contradictory undercurrents to this fatwa.
Within these different orders run a number of themes charged with
political electricity which directly and indirectly inform the Rushdie
affair. Particularly charged are questions of human rights challenges to
the legitimacy of Khomeini's fatwa, which also raise the persistent mat-
ing, a poetic model, is often described as the greatest work of poetry in the Arabic
language. The ArabicIslamic world has, in fact, produced a great heritage of poetry
and other art in this Qur'anic and pre-Qur'anic tradition. Nonetheless, a suspicion of
art forms and motifs outside of traditional Islamic modes remains. Malise Ruthven,
somewhat simplistically, even goes so far as to suggest that although many books say
rather hateful things about Islam, it was the novel form of The Satanic Verses which
gave rise to the intense reactions surrounding the book. MAItSa RurHvEN, A SATAN-
ic AFFAm SALMAN Rustmm AND THE RAGE OF ISLAM (1990).
8. One of the bitter ironies in the political and social context of Rushdie's
situation is that Rushdie had been an outspoken critic of the West's cultural domi-
nance. The fact that he has been so fiercely repudiated and taken as a representative
of this cultural dominance speaks to the arrogance of an intellectual discourse which
purports post-modernism, which claims to speak for an undifferentiated mass of people
with whom it may be quite politically, intellectually, and spiritually disconnected.
While this paper concerns the legal aspects of Khomeini's fansa, one of the more
fascinating aspects of the affair is the issue of group and individual identity. The
affair gives a glimpse, paradoxically, of both the rigidity and kaleidoscope-like
changeability of the definition of these identities.
9. See infra pp. 418-22 (comparing the enforcement of the fabwa with Great
Britain's blasphemy laws which apply only to Christianity).
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ter of cultural relativism. Can international law, and more specifically
human rights law, pass judgment on a separate order of law which
flows from an entirely different source--one based on the eternal truths
of God's words, rather than the asserted natural rights of humankind?
Within this well worn debate lies perhaps a more bitter and ultimately
more important debate over hate speech. Can a community legitimately
protect itself from communication it finds morally offensive? Can an
individual indiscriminately abuse the sacred beliefs of others? In what
way can a community, or in this case a state claiming to speak as a
community, legitimately respond to such a perceived attack?
After sketching out these and other underlying themes to the Rushdie
affair in a discursive, introductory fashion, a more systematic elaboration
will follow of the place of Khomeini's fatwa in Islamic and international
law, as seen in the context of Iranian domestic and international politics.
As indicated, particular attention will be paid to human rights issues,
communal libel, and cultural relativism.
I. THEMES UNDERLYING THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR
A. SPIRITUAL ORDER VS. TEMPORAL ORDER IN ISLAMIC LAW
The Rushdie affair, which culminated in Khomeini's fatwa, demon-
strates first and foremost the ever-present tension between divine law
absolutes and the political complexities and difficulties with which the
real world obstructs the application of such law. Historically, spiritual
orders have often attempted to maintain the appearance of aloofness
from direct involvement in messy and compromising temporal realities.
Nonetheless, the tension between these two interdependent orders, the
spiritual and the temporal, existed in a variety of fashions throughout
history. The shifting balances between these two orders are defined both
by a competition for the power to translate moral and political argu-
ments into law, and by a mutual need: the spiritual order for the ability
of temporal rule to maintain its institutional position, and the temporal
for the spiritual order to justify and morally legitimize (or, at the least,
acquiesce to) its rule.
Prior to the Iranian revolution, Shi'a Islam was noted for its relatively
accommodating attitude toward Iran's temporal ruling orders.'" The Is-
10. See SAID AMiR ARiOMAND, THE SHADOW OF GOD AND THE HIDDEN IMAM:
RELIGION, POLICAL ORDER, AND SOCIETAL CHANGE IN SHI'ITE IRAN FROM THE
BEGINNING TO 1890 (1984) (providing a history of Shi'ism and its political engage-
ments). See generally MOOJAN MOMEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SH'I ISLAM (1985)
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lamic Republic of Iran's departure from this is a relatively rare (and, fif-
teen years after the revolution, still somewhat ambiguous) example of an
attempt to mesh these two orders by translating a particular version of
divine natural law into the temporal sphere." Khomeini defined his po-
litical project as seeking a state in which "[t]he sole determining princi-
ple in a government ... is divine law, law that is the expression of
divine will, not the product of the human mind."'" In other words, di-
vine natural law will assert itself over secular, positive law and will
govern through the insight of the velayat-i faqih, none other than
Khomeini himself.'3
This attempt to apply divine law directly, though ambiguous and
partial, nevertheless created a tremendous degree of stress among these
various orders. The Rushdie affair is just one symptom of the debris left
when one man's insight into the divine order clashes with the plurality
and complexity of real world legal and political orders. As demonstrated
by the Rushdie affair, the most fundamental result of the meshing of
these orders was that the Shi'a uarea in Iran were forced to abandon
their traditional role as the guardian of the guardians-the moral check
on arbitrary power.'4 With an identification of religious, legal, and po-
litical power in the same institution, who is left to guard the guardians
from their own excesses?
(presenting history of Shi'a Islam); HAMID DABASHi. THEOLOGY OF DIsco,'Nr:. THE
IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN (1993) (supplying
an analysis of the different ideological modes present in the Iranian revolution); Nikki
Keddie, Religion and Rule in Iran A Historical Perspective, in MIDDLE EAST IN-
SIGHT July-Aug. 1995 (providing a brief summary of Shi'ism in Iran); HAsw u,
MA'RUUF AL-HAsANI, AL-SH'ISM BAYNA AL-ASHA'IRA WA-AL-MU'TAZILA [Shi'ism
between the Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites] (1978) (giving a history and analysis of
Shi'ism); MUHAMAD ISMAIL, FIRAQ AL-SHI'A [Shi'a Sects] (1995) (explaining the
historical influence of different sects and ideologies on contemporary Shi'ism).
11. It is worth noting that the dominance of Iran's Shi'a hierarchy by figures
committed to an apolitical role was reversed in the course of a generation by the
secularizing excesses of the Shah, which instigated a radical reaction by the Shi'a
leadership and all forces within Iranian society.
12. IMAM KHOMII, ISLAM AND REVOLurION 330 (1985). Islamist politics, for
all their diversity, generally share this divine natural law basis.
13. Sayyid Qotb, a leading theorist of political Islam states that "the sharia re-
vealed in the Qur'an is the law of all times, because it is the witness of God---the
law of religion made for man."
14. See MOMEN, supra note 10, at 191-93 (discussing the ulama's attitude to-
wards political authority).
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B. NATURAL vs. PosITvE LAw IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Perhaps international human rights may serve as a guardian. Human
rights law is based on an ill-defined philosophy combining natural law
impulses with positive law enactments which seek, for their part, to
check arbitrary power. This natural law impulse was first expressed in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)'s and is a reflec-
tion both of the social contract philosophy of Rousseau and Locke's
notion of the individual's autonomy from the state' first institutional-
ized in the United States."7 This impulse has remained as human rights
law has evolved, but it is sustained by different sources. Some see the
foundation of human rights in Ciceronian right reason, i.e., the ability,
through rational discourse, to find the analogues in other cultures which
are the basis of universal law." Others see their basis as flowing from
religious conceptions, whether explicitly deistic in the sense that human
beings have rights "endowed by their Creator," or more purely moral in
the sense that religious values translate into rights. A natural rights basis
for human rights is also found in Rawlsian theories of justice, in which
principles of liberty and equality are balanced, 9 or in other variants on
the liberal ideal which range from radical restrictions on the role of the
15. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
16. See David Weissbrodt, An Introduction to the Sources of International Human
Rights Law, C 399 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1 (1989) (citing various philosophical foundations
for human rights theory).
17. See JEROME HuYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: TiE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE
FOUNDING ERA 149-74 (1994) (discussing Locke's classic essay, The True, Original,
Extent and End of Civil Government).
18. See Bassam Tibi, Islamic Law, Human Rights, and Morality, 16 HUM. RTS.
Q. 297 (1994) (describing the conflict between human rights and Islam as "the con-
flict between a man(reason)-centered and a cosmological theocentric view"). "IThere
must be some grounds for universally valid comparisons that facilitate drawing general
conclusions . . . . Comparisons on universal grounds and knowledge, as is the case
with international human rights law, are acceptable and must be admitted." Id. at 294-
95.
19. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see Jerome Shestack, The Juris-
prudence of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 85-99 (1984) (discussing the various theoretical perspectives on human
rights).
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state,' to more egalitarian conceptions," or conceptions based on the
"super value" of dignity.'
With a coherent philosophy of human rights yet to emerge, the uni-
versality of human rights appears to be the rhetoric of a political pro-
ject, rather than the expression of an established fact. This incoherence,
however, should not mask thd fact that what might be called a "shifting
universality" has, in fact, solidified itself as people from various per-
spectives have come to see human rights as the common language by
which their political and social ideals can gain force with general con-
sensus on a number of rights. The great success of human rights has
been the translation of the UDHR, a natural law declaration, into a
series of interlocking positive law treaties and agreements binding on
their signatories;' thereby, bridging the philosophical divide separating
natural and positive law. This positivization of the natural law precepts
of the UDHR is also the ultimate answer to cultural relativism. A solid
core of human rights norms have reached a point where, with only a
few exceptions, they are now universally accepted by treaty2 " Explicit
consent is not culturally relative.
The consent given these international agreements, however, is consid-
ered by many to be superficial, merely reflecting the international
community's pressures on the elite and unrepresentative governments
that have long held sway in much of the Third World. The universality
of human rights, both as natural and positive law, continues to be chal-
lenged rhetorically in terms of a defensive and often unconvincing re-
treat into cultural relativism. More forcefully, the universality of human
rights is challenged by competing divine natural law orders that refuse
to submit to the proclaimed universalities of human rights. The Interna-
20. See generally JOHN GRAY, PosT-LmE.AaSM (1993) (arguing that only a civil
society can be the basis for maintaining liberty in a post-modem world).
21. See RONALD DwoRKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 150 (1977) (discussing
egalitarian conceptions of human rights).
22. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL, HUMtAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBUC
ORDER: THE BAsic PoLIciEs Op AN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF HUMAN DIGNITY 368
(1988) (describing a conception of human rights that focuses on the dignity of men
and women).
23. See Weissbrodt, supra note 16, at 7-10 (setting forth a concise history of the
developments of international human rights law after World War I1).
24. See id. at 10 (listing the following universal human rights as accepted by
treaty: the protection of life, liberty and the security of the person; guarantees of
freedom of expression, religion, association and movement; and freedom from slavery,
arbitrary arrest, imprisonment without a fair trial, and invasions of privacy).
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1 for example,
enshrines protections of rights of free expression,' freedom of reli-
gion,' a fair trial,' and the right to life,29 each within certain limita-
tions. Iran is a signatory without reservation to this treaty," and the
Islamic Republic has reasserted its adherence. Despite this, in the
Rushdie affair Iran would seem to be systematically and unapologetically
violating its treaty obligations-against explicit Qur'anic edicts to respect
treaties 31 -on the putative basis of fidelity to the sharia's higher law.
C. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW VS. ISLAMIC LAW
In exploring the Rushdie affair one finds that although both interna-
tional human rights and Islamic law can have their excesses and points
of conflict, they are by no means fundamentally incompatible. In fact,
structurally, each system is rather diffuse and non-hierarchical, and each
is constructed to compromise with the political and practical limits of
applying law. Of course, in the give and take between the legal and the
political, each order can sometimes overextend itself. The Rushdie case
is an example of such an overextension-a particular case where laws
apply outside the accepted, traditional limits to Iranian or Shi'a Islam's
power-more than it is a case of fundamental incompatibility. As a
legal-political order, Islam in fact has a long tradition of respecting
norms of international coexistence. a2 In the long term, I would suggest
that international and domestic pressure will ultimately help force the
Islamic Republic of Iran to retreat from its ctirrent confrontational posi-
tion and return to this tradition.
While the fatwa is perhaps an "overextension," one must also recog-
nize that as a natural law order, Islam, like all religious orders, implicit-
ly lends itself to absolutist interpretations which do not recognize politi-
cal limits. A religion's institutional mediators between God and believ-
ers-in the case of Islam the relatively diffuse ulama-hold their power
25. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe.
A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
26. Id. art. 19(2).
27. Id. art. 18(1).
28. Id. art. 14.
29. Id. art. 6.
30. See ICCPR, supra note 25. Iran signed the Covenant on April 4, 1968 and
ratified it on June 24, 1975.
31. See infra p. 412 (discussing treaties in Islamic law).
32. See MAJiD KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM (1955).
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on the claim of specialized knowledge of eternal truths that lead to
salvation.33 Given a particular political context, there is always the la-
tent possibility of absolutist interpretations which will move the faithful
away from the norm of accepting plural national and international com-
munities and towards accepting extremist xenophobia. Such ex-
tremes-even if not the norm-cannot be dismissed as a fluke, particu-
larly given their current popular resonance. They are an implicit possi-
bility in any natural law system in which one group can claim a monop-
oly on truth.
Thus, even if modes of international coexistence are embedded in
positive law treaties, a natural law order-such as the Islamic Republic
of Iran-will always have a degree of tension with such positivist, secu-
lar law. An order based on religious truths, when subject to extreme
interpretations due to particular political contexts, can lead to dangerous,
absolutist outcomes. Khomeini and his followers may be on Islam's
historic fringe, but they still represent a very real possibility within the
Islamic order.
Paradoxically, such an absolutist movement can be stimulated by an
overextension, in its turn, by the human rights movement with its natu-
ral law basis. The absolutist rhetoric of universal rights can arouse a
political backlash among those who have historical reasons to fear the
universalizing goods of Europeans and Americans. The real danger of
the human rights movement's reliance on an ideology of universal rights
is that it has a polarizing effect: it raises mistrust and places local hu-
man rights activists in the politically uncomfortable position of siding
with those "universal" values popularly identified with outside powers,
rather than working with "indigenous," local traditions. However cliche
and unfair the perception of such categories, it could well be that, tacti-
cally, universalizing language may have outlived its usefulness. At this
point the universal vs. cultural particularities debate often obscures more
than it illuminates.
In other words, the Islamic and international orders are broadly com-
patible, but there are particular points of conflict. If interpreted or im-
posed in a certain way, the Qur'an contains edicts in express contra-
diction with human rights norms.' In the normal course of attempting
33. See GLASSE, supra note 1, at 407 (recognizing ulama as a scholars or au-
thorities in the religious sciences). Uama, in fact, is translated from the Arabic as
"those with knowledge."
34. See infra pp. 395-96 (showing Islamic law has incontrovertible clashes in
areas of nondiscrimination, in which both explicit Qur'anic verses and Islamic tradi-
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to coexist in the international order, such points are usually finessed.
However, there is always the implicit potential for extremist interpreta-
tions leading to confrontation and conflict. So, though there can be (and
usually is) coexistence with a natural law order, this can never be abso-
lutely secure.
Furthermore, at a certain point the attempt to push human rights
norms as universal truths may be counterproductive, stimulating resis-
tance and mobilizing opposition from competing natural law orders,
instead of advancing the concretization of rights. With the positivization
of human rights law, it may be more beneficial to attempt to move
beyond the fruitless universalism vs. cultural relativism debate. By ques-
tioning each of the poles of this debate, one can perhaps consolidate the
gains already made in human rights and expand them on the basis of
cross-cultural consensus,35 muting the language of universalism which
carries with it the political baggage of the United States and Western
European political dominance. The absolutes of natural law had an es-
sential role in stimulating the enactment of human rights law; the full
implementation of this law, however, may require a more carefully
calibrated strategy of cooperation with other orders of law. In fact, hu-
man rights norms are sufficiently flexible that, in the main, and despite
overheated rhetoric of cultural imperialism, they have no difficulty work-
ing with other orders of law.
A human right to freedom of life, religion, or expression clashing
with the somewhat archaic use of Islamic norms of blasphemy or apos-
tasy is not, in any case, the fundamental reason that the Rushdie affair
is of such urgency. It is urgent because Iran is attempting to enforce its
legal judgment outside of its prescriptive jurisdiction, against all norms
of the current secular international legal order and Islamic law.36 In
terms of the fatwa threatening Rushdie's life, human rights-minus some
tions are relatively uncontested).
35. See Abdullah A. An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining
International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPEC-
TivEs 19, 20 (Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) (maintaining that "observance of
human rights standards can be improved through the enhancement of cultural legitima-
cy of those standards").
36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (recognizing a state's jurisdiction to
prescribe laws with respect to, among other things, conduct which takes place within
its territory or conduct outside its territory which has a substantial effect within its
territory).
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tortured constructions-have little to say about attempting to restrict the
right of free expression, life, or religion outside of a state's jurisdiction.
Human rights fundamentally regard the relation of a state to its own
citizens and those who reside within its territorial jurisdiction.' Iran's
attempts to enforce the judgment of the fatwa--despite the obvious lack
of an extradition treaty for apostasy-are a violation of a much more
fundamental notion of international law: the territorial integrity of
states? If one looks at the fatwa on Rushdie as a violation of the
norms of the international order, it becomes an international relations
issue in which one must gauge the political, horizontal reaction which
Khomeini's fatwa stimulated within the international state system.
This is not to say that human rights are irrelevant. In the Rushdie
affair, Iran arguably violated several human rights norms. As will be
seen, perhaps the most interesting and difficult of these norms is the
question of communal libel. Communal libel raises a paradox: has Iran
violated Article 20 of the ICCPR through its incitement of violence
against Rushdie, or can Iran, citing events in South Africa, India, Paki-
stan, and the United Kingdom, legitimately claim justification for the
banning of The Satanic Verses on the basis of maintaining public order
and, more broadly, protecting the sanctity of its religious-political com-
munity? Ideologies based on notions of ethnic, cultural, or religious
purity may increasingly see blasphemous (or critical, depending on the
perspective) speech as an attack, justifying retribution." Before accept-
ing a group right to proscribe "communal libel," it is necessary to seri-
ously grapple with the implications of allowing groups to define accept-
able speech. Which groups should do so? Who speaks for a group?
Based on what criteria? How can one reconcile such a group right with
the rights of individuals and other communities?
37. See RICHARD BILDER, AN OVERVmW IN GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICE 3 (H. Hannum ed., 1984) (basing the human rights movement on a
recognition that every state has an obligation to respect the rights of its citizens).
38. See Louis HENKm, How NATIONS BEHAVE 18 (1968) (deeming internal
sovereignty a fundamental principle of international law).
39. See NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 75-76 (1991) (identifying religious intolerance as a major cause of human rights
violations).
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D. THE POLITICAL SETrING IN IRAN AND THE FATWA'S IMPACT ON
IRAN'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Outrage over The Satanic Verses came about at a moment of acute
social conflict and political change.' The fatwa was issued after the
book was banned in many countries, and after violent and deadly pro-
tests in Pakistan, India, and Britain.' In Iran, it came immediately after
Khomeini, under intense domestic political pressure, agreed to the "bitter
pill" of a ceasefire with Iraq, and at a time when the then-Speaker of
the Parliament Rafsanjani, President Ali Khamenei, and successor-desig-
nate Ayatollah Montazeri were calling for moderation.4" The debate
over who was more revolutionary and who was more Islamic gained
renewed vitality with the fatwa, a process that favored the radical fac-
tions43 and Khomeini's apparent intention of revitalizing revolutionary
fervor."
The extraordinary ideological tumult of the Iranian revolution resulted
in unprecedented formulations of Islam and Islamic politics. In the
course of this tumult, a remarkable sense of Islamic revolutionary com-
40. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GUARDIANS OF THOUGHT. LIMITS ON FREEDOM
OF ExPREssION IN IRAN 86 (1993) (noting that Khomeini issued the fatwa under
"peculiar political circumstances").
41. Id.
42. See id. at 114-16 (commenting on Iran's punishment of political opponents).
It is also noted that Ayatollah Montazeri was dropped as designated successor because
he failed to support the fatwa. Id. at 86 n.4.
43. Id. at 86.
44. See THE Rus-mE FILE, supra note 2, at 186 (suggesting that accusations of
heresy, blasphemy, sedition, and corruption are often raised by upholders of orthodoxy
at such moments of political and social tension). The frequency of such tensions,
however, calls into question their usefulness as a defining variable. Cf. Galileo, in 19
THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 638-39 (1995) (discussing the Roman Catholic
Church's suppression of Galileo's discovery proving the Copernican Doctrine).
Galileo's prosecution, for example, took place at the height of the battle in Europe
between Protestantism and Catholicism, and this tension seemed to stimulate the Jesuit
charge that Galileo's teachings "could have worse consequences on the established
system of teaching than Luther and Calvin together." Id. While in 1616, Galileo had
simply been told to neither "hold nor defend" his doctrine, in 1633 he was compelled
to stand trial for "vehement suspicion of heresy" and ordered to recant by saying he
"abjured, cursed, and detested" his past errors. Galileo added after his recantation, "e
poi, se muove"--"and yet, it moves." Id. In deference to his age, the Pope (Urban)
commuted his imprisonment to house arrest. Id. Like Rushdie, Galileo did have some
sense of the tricky theological territory into which he had ventured, but neither he
nor Rushdie foresaw the political maelstrom which would result.
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munity was created, propelling Iranians to the sacrifices necessary for
the Shah's overthrow. The creation of such an Islamic political commu-
nity, however, relied on a radical "us" and "them" division of the world,
the consequences of which Iran's political leadership has not been able
to escape. With political legitimacy tied to the demonization of the
"other," Iran has maintained a (politically convenient) stance of a belea-
guered community at war with the world. The targeting of Rushdie is
part of a general mode of strictly defining a putatively pure Islam-
ic/Shi'a/Iranian community under attack from the outside-from "the
West"--and forced to respond. This response is particularly virulent in
the case of an accused blasphemer or apostate, such as Rushdie, a theo-
retical betrayer of the community.
The unfortunate results of this strict definition of a singular communi-
ty opposed to all other communities points to the general dangers of
group rights. Such rights, often based in rather regimented and/or ro-
mantic notions of community, tend to stifle members of the putatively
"protected" community and promote the separation of this community
from others with which it must interact. This can lead to internal abuses
of the rights of dissenting individuals and communities, and external
conflict. In the case of Iran, internally this manifests itself in the perse-
cution of Bahai's and dissenting Muslims; externally, in its combative
relations with regional neighbors and the international community.'
The fatwa is not just a product of a particular social and political
context. It is also a stunning example of how law has a somewhat mys-
tical permanence, in a manner which can have a lasting effect on inter-
national relations. Khomeini's fatwa took a passing event and made it a
lasting albatross around Iran's relations with the non-Islamic world.
Khomeini's successors have given every indication they would like to
rid Iran of this impediment to better relations, but the fact that this
opinion was justified with the weight of law-divine law, at that-has
so far made this impossible.
In a sense, the chilling effect on Iran's international relations is some-
what curious. The fate of a literary author is certainly of no major im-
portance to the Great Powers, especially one whose Third Worldist
politics had never made him a close friend of the powers that be.'
45. See IRAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL CommuNITY 124 (Anoushiravan
Ehteshami & Manshour Varosteb eds., 1991) (analyzing Iran's relations with other
nations).
46. See DANIEL PIPEs, THE RusHDmE AFFAIR: THE NOVEL, THE AYATOLLAH AND
THE WEST 41-43 (1990) (summarizing Rushdie's academic and literary achievements
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Nonetheless, Britain, the United States, the European Union, and Iran's
regional neighbors have since had noticeably cool relations with Iran.'
This is not only because of Rushdie, of course. Extraterritorial assassi-
nations and the funding and arming of extremist political movements in
other countries have also kept relations from developing beyond an
unavoidable (though considerable) level of trade and diplomatic contact.
The coolness of relations is not due specifically to Rushdie or even to
these other matters, but to what these matters signify more broadly: a
lack of respect for the norms of the international order. Those of the
realist school would have one believe that a matter which has little to
do with national self-interest will not have an impact on a country's
foreign policy." The international reaction to Iran's transgressions of
the norms of the international order, however, show that this order is
more than the Hobbesian jungle the realists suggest. Although one can-
not contend that the Rushdie affair is any country's highest priority, it is
part of a pattern of Iranian action which has brought on the horizontal
enforcement of the international community 4 -- based solely on the in-
terests of the norms of the international order itself, not exclusively on
defined national interests.50
Beyond the specific "enforcement" actions taken by the international
community, Iran's transgressions have also earned it a general mistrust
from the United States and European foreign policy community." This
within British society).
47. See Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran and the European Community, in IRAN
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 61 (Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Manshour
Varosteb eds., 1991) (discussing relations between the European Community and Iran).
Economic interdependence was a catalyst for improvements in relations between the
two entities but, despite expectations, Iran has not countermanded the fatwa, though it
has announced it will not actively pursue Rushdie. Id. at 72.
48. See RAINo MALNES, NATIONAL INTERESTS, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 43 (1994) (examining the validity of the "absolute priority principle" which
purports that a nation's primary national interests, such as national security and eco-
nomic prosperity, come before all other concerns).
49. See Anthony D'Amato, The Moral and Legal Basis for Sanctions, 19
FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFs. 19 (1995) (discussing the enforcement capacity of
the international order).
50. See Graham Fuller, Lecture at The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy
(Apr. 18, 1995) (discussing the impact of Iran on the national interests of other na-
tions). Of course, Iranian funding of opposition groups in other countries is, for those
countries, a direct attack on their national interests. As Fuller points out, however, it
is only in Lebanon that Iranian funding has been a major factor in another country's
domestic politics-in this case, of course, it also has had serious ramifications on
Israel's national interests. Id.
51. See Eric Hooglund, The United States and Iran, 1981-89, in IRAN AND THE
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mistrust is expressed most bluntly in Samuel Huntington's Clash of
Civilizations? thesis, which holds that a country such as Iran is inevita-
bly opposed to the interests of the "West."' Though Huntington's the-
sis is crude and misleading, it does indicate the degree of mistrust Iran
has earned, which undermines its interests.' Whether it be in relatively
minor, immediate matters-such as the oil production deal with Conoco
which was recently canceled due to United States pressure--or mat-
ters of more long term significance-such as the refusal of the IIMF to
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 31 (Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Manshour Varosteb eds.,
1991) (outlining the Reagan Administration's policy toward Iran); see also ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT (EIU) COUNTRY REPORTS, Iran, 11 (Feb. 19, 1996) (hereinafter
EIU COUNTRY REPORTS]. The Report states that the farwa:
continues to bedevil Iranian relations with the EU .. . Despite talks on the
issue between Iranian and European foreign ministry officials in December
[1995] the position remains unchanged. The Iranian government has given a
pledge that it will not seek to pursue the death sentence issued against Mr.
Rushdie, but refuses to give a written guarantee ...The only possible resolu-
tion would be for a leading Iranian jurist, with the backing of the regime, to
give a counter-judgement to the original fatwa. This is unlikely to happen in
the foreseeable future.
Id.
52. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FORmGN AFFs. 22,
39 (1993) (contending that conflicts between civilizations will define international
politics in the future). Huntington's claim is, in a sense, parallel to the universal
rights/cultural relativism debate. Id. Huntington argues from the political right what
some relativists argue from the political left: that cultural differences are fundamental
to interactions in the international order. Are Muslims, in essence, different? Are Is-
lamic states fundamentally opposed to the rest of the international order? Or does not
historical experience show that states of the Muslim world are as diverse in their
politics as any other region of the world, in a manner which defies classification by
supposed Islamic essence? ld. at 41 (contrasting the Western concept of "universal
civflization" with the "particularism" of many Asian cultures).
53. I would argue that a "clash" between culturally relative orders is contradicted
by the historical norm of the Islamic world's complementary relationship with other
legal/political orders. Extreme movements, such as that led by Khomeini, should not
be exaggerated into signifying the entire Islamic world or Islamic history. See Antho-
ny Chase, Bridges Over Barricades: The Fallacies of Samuel Huntington's Clash of
Civilizations?, STANFORD J. INT'L AFi. (1994) (critiquing Huntington's Clash of Civi-
lizations?).
54. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995) (prohibiting United
States citizens from contracting to develop or finance the development of Iranian
petroleum resources); see also Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton Administration Blasts
Dupont's Conoco Unit Over Oil Contract With Iran, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at
A5 (identifying the Administration's concerns that Conoco's contract was inconsistent
with United States policy toward Iran).
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extend requested loans-Iran's "rogue" status, earned in part and clearly
symbolized by its fatwa on Rushdie, has harmed it greatly.
The price the international order has exacted from Iran, though per-
haps insufficient, has had its effect on the domestic lives of Iranians"
and, possibly, their rising political discontent. There are elements of the
Iranian leadership, including President Rafsanjani, who would apparently
like to reverse this ostracization in order to focus on improving Iran's
economy. In fact, despite the entrenched position of radical supporters of
an extremist line, there are indications of a continuing shift to pragma-
tism. A shift which seems to have been continued in the March 1996
elections.56
E. ART, RELIGION, POLITICS AND LAW
Lastly, touching on some of the above-mentioned points and by way
of introducing the more elaborated section of this article, the Rushdie
affair is an example of the intimate interrelationship among art, religion,
politics, and law. The divine law sanction on book and author shows the
force which religion can infuse in politics, both in the sense of the elite
manipulations of a Khomeini and the heartfelt feeling of insult by mil-
lions of Muslims. Many Muslims took the book-with very little
prompting-as an attack on their identity and culture's sacred roots, a
testimonial to the power of religion and the intensity of feeling which a
work of art can produce.57
55. See Iran: Tied Economy, Tied President, ECONOMIST, July 16, 1994 (discuss-
ing the challenges facing the Iranian economy, especially its foreign debt); see also
Scheherazade Danshkhu & Gillian Telt, No Cause for Celebration: Iran's Economic
Problems are Worsening, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1995, at 16 (noting Iran's crisis, rising
debt, and lack of investment).
56. See Milton Viorst, Changing Iran: The Limits of Revolution, 74 FOREIGN
AFIs. 63 (1995) (noting that since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, there has been an
increased questioning of the Islamic regime's legitimacy); see also Hushang Ansary,
Beyond the Great Satan: How the U.S. and Iran can Mend Their Rift, WASH. POST,
June 9, 1995, at C3 (commenting on the political discontent among numerous social
groups, including the Shi'ite clergy, in Iran).
57. Cf Russel Chandler, 25,000 Gather at Universal to Protest Film, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 1988, at Al (recounting the widespread criticism aimed at Martin Scorcese's
film The Last Temptation of Christ). In the movie, Scorcese depicts Satan as trying
to tempt Christ off the cross with a vision in which he has a sexual encounter with
Mary Magdalene and in which he lives the life of an ordinary man. Jay Car, Movie
Review: The Last Temptation of Christ, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1988, at 25.
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If one questions the legitimacy of the fanva in terms of the religious,
legal and political orders, one cannot forget that these orders are quite
entangled. An Islamic scholar's edict that the fana is illegitimate may
have little popular resonance and, thereby, scant real world effect.
Khomeini, though quite learned, was not considered a first-rate legal
scholar by his colleagues. The political resonance of his message, how-
ever, earned him the stature of an Ayatollah, a Grand Ayatollah, and
eventually, Imam-the highest legal and spiritual authority in Shi'a Is-
lam. Law and politics separated from religion are enervated; any analy-
sis must take account of their intimate connections.
II. THE ISLAMIC LEGAL ORDER
A. THE FATWA'S ABSOLUTIST DEFENDERS AND CRITICS
It is both condescending and counterproductive to condemn
Khomeini's fatwa without even a nod toward understanding its basis in
Islamic law and political context and the rage of those who feel they
are the whipping post of Western military, political, and cultural power.
Norman Stone, for example, in commenting on the fanva explains with
a very broad brush that "Islam is the religion, after all, of the ferocious
Ayatollahs, of suicide-bombings and hostage taking; of the Afghan sects,
who, no doubt, will soon be meting revenge on [sic] collaborators with
the Soviets. Salman Rushdie has learned this, in a very hard way."
This sort of inflammatory rhetoric is an absurd misunderstanding of the
real forces at work within the Islamic world. Even more inflammatory
and counterproductive is the polemic published by Rushdie's friend Fay
Weldon, whose generally offensive remarks include the fabricated claim
of a Qur'anic verse saying "[w]hen the unbeliever holds out his hand,
take it. But when he turns his back, slay him."" Weldon goes on to
say that the Qur'an "gives weapons and strength to the thought-po-
lice-and the thought-police are easily set marching... You can build
a decent society around the Bible... but the Koran? No."
58. Norman Stone, We Need Russian Help Against Islam, THE DAILY TELE-
GRAPH, Feb. 19, 1989, in SACRILEGE VERsus CWVILITY, supra note 2, at 77.
59. FAY WELDON, SACRED Cows 7 (1989).
60. d Perhaps the most arrogant statement comes from a surprising source,
Conor Cruise O'Brien in a May 1989 interview in The London Tunes. O'Brien states
that "Muslim society looks profoundly repulsive . . . because it is repulsive . . . . At
the heart of the matter is the Muslim family, an abominable institution... al-
Afghani wrote 'Every Muslim is sick and his only remedy is in the Koran.' Unfortu-
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Less silly, but perhaps more telling, the International Fellowship of
Reconciliation, in a communication delivered to the ECOSOC Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
claimed that "[tihe international community is entitled to an unequivocal
clarification on the precise point [i.e., the validity of the fatwa] from the
most authoritative Islamic bodies as to whether such rulings are binding
today."6' The demand for a ruling from some presumed authoritative
Islamic body--one supposes a counterpart to the Vatican is imagined-
displays a misunderstanding of the structures of Islamic law, in which
authority is quite diffuse, with a deliberate shying away from the cre-
ation of "authoritative bodies."
On the other hand, an uncritical acceptance of Khomeini's fatwa as a
legitimate expression of the Islamic legal tradition and existing Muslim
political sentiment risks a reductionism as severe as that of those who
refuse to take Islamic law seriously. There have been apologia for
Khomeini's fatwa which underestimate the diversity and depth of the
Islamic legal tradition, patronizing it with an assumption that Khomeini's
edict represents the only face of a monolithic Islam and must be re-
spected as such. John Allemang, for example, writes that denouncing
threats and intimidation of Rushdie are a "definition of the right to
protest [which] is just one more way in which Westerners would impose
their values on the Islamic world .... because religion embraces all
decision-making in a traditional Moslem [sic] society, it becomes impos-
sible to treat the writer's critical comments as anything other than an
attack on the foundations of society." 2 This undifferentiated relativism
ignores Islamic societies' diverse history-including long periods when
the Islamic world was a bastion of tolerance-in favor of a cliched "de-
fense" of a putatively communitarian Islam. It presumes tolerance to be
an exclusively American and European value, condescendingly assuming
that the Islamic world has not and cannot share this value. This line of
thought provides a good example of how defenders of group or commu-
nity rights often do so on the basis of rigid, unchanging definitions of a
nately the sickness gets worse the more the remedy is taken." RICHARD WEBSTER, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY: LIBERALISM, CENSORSHIP AND THE SATANIC VERSES
43 (1990) (quoting Conor Cruise O'Brien and finding these comments contemptuous
and racist).
61. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1993/NG0/1 91 11.
62. John Allemang, The Islamic World: Going Too Far, reprinted in THE
RUSHDiE FILE, supra note 2, at 216-17.
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community, which do more violence to the vibrant realities of history
and contemporary life than any outsiders "imposing their values."
Both forms of absolutists-defenders and critics of Rushdie-share an
assumption that a monolithic Islam exists which either must be resisted
or uncritically respected. In fact, Khomeini's position is somewhat novel
in the history of the Islamic world and can be criticized from within the
Islamic legal tradition. There are two essential novelties: one, the target-
ing of someone outside of the dar al-Islam;' and, two, the ambiguity
in specifying the actual crime with which Rushdie is charged. ' There
is, indeed, a lively dialogue on this very subject in the Islamic world,
with its wide diversity of scholars, schools of law, domestic legal sys-
tems, and social contexts. While The Satanic Verses is widely regarded
as a vile insult, it is only in a relatively few areas that the reaction has
been violent; most Muslims have shrugged off the book with equanimi-
ty, while some have even contested the legal basis of the fahva.
It is, thus, productive to approach Khomeini's fanva by respectfully
acknowledging the contradictions within the tradition which forms its
context. The Qur'an, for example, says "there is no compulsion in mat-
ters of faith." While a hadith-a tradition of the Prophet-says
"whomsoever changes religion, kill him".' Such contradictions, howev-
er startling, are inherent in any sprawling, living, tradition-one need
only contrast the Old Testament's "eye for an eye" injunction against
the New Testament's "turn the other cheek," to understand that this is
in no way limited to Islam.
63. See GLASSF, supra note 1, at 93 (defining dar al-Islam as referring to territo-
ries where Islam and Islamic law prevail).
64. Fatwas on literary authors seem to be a growth industry. A comparison to
the fatwa on Taslima Nasrin, however, demonstrates the novelty of Khomeini's fatwa.
Nasrin has been threatened with fatwas by different Bangladeshi mullahs who do not
have the power to call in a state apparatus to enforce their legal judgments. In the
Rushdie case, Khomeini's fatwa was an official expression of the centralized Iranian
state, thus combining Islamic law legitimacy with old-fashioned government persecu-
tion of writers.
65. Sura 2:256, reprinted in ALl, supra note 7, at 45.
66. Ahadith citations refer to the authoritative compilations of Bukhai and others.
For a useful collection regarding apostasy, one can consult SHEIK GAD HAQ AL-GAD
HAQ, FATAAWA ISLAAIYYA Fi AL-QADAAYAA AL-,fu'AASAR [Islamic fanas on con-
temporary issues] 357-69 (1990).
67. Exodus 21:24 (King James) (stating "[elye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot").
68. Matthew 5:39 (King James) (stating "[b]ut I say unto you, that ye resist not
evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek turn to him the other also").
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B. THE FA7WA
To God we belong and to Him we shall return. I inform all zealous
Muslims of the world that the author of The Satanic Verses-which has
been compiled, printed, and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet,
and the Qur'an-and all those involved in its publication who were aware
of its content are sentenced to death.
I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they
may be found, so that no one else will dare to insult the sacred beliefs of
Muslims. Whoever is killed on this path is a martyr. In addition, anyone
who has access to the author of this book, but is not able to carry out his
execution, should inform someone else so that the punishment may be
executed.'
In looking at the fatwa, one must begin by defiming some narrow
points which remain vague on a first reading. The actual crime with
which Rushdie is charged, for example, is not stated. Is the crime in-
suit? Heresy? Blasphemy? Apostasy? Are the publishers of The Satanic
Verses sentenced to death for the same reason or for a different crime?
None of this is stated, making for a rather peculiar legal statement,
particularly given the specificity which normally characterizes fatwas. °
Specifically, the fatwa only describes Rushdie as guilty of acting
against Islam, which is not defined as a crime under Islamic law. The
Islamic sharia7' specifies five hadd crimes, which carry some form of
obligatory punishment: adultery, false accusation of adultery, wine drink-
ing, theft, and brigandage.' In addition, apostasy and rebellion are con-
69. See supra note 1.
70. See Sadik J. A1-Azm, Is the Fatwa a Fatwa?, in FOR RUsIm: ESSAYS BY
ARAB AND MUSLIM WRITERS IN DEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH 21-23 (1994) (interpreting
Khomeini's fatwa as a judgement instead of a fatwa in the traditional sense). A fatwa
is normally a response or solution to the problems which confront followers of the
faith. Id. at 21. It usually tries "to avoid unnecessary injury to life, limb, property,
family, [and] community ...... Id. See generally AL-AZM, supra note 2 (analyzing
the Rushdie affair and the fatwa).
71. See THE SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (1953) (explaining that the sharia
may be classed in "two main groups according to their subject (1) regulations relat-
ing to worship and ritual duties; (2) regulations of a juridical and political nature").
These two classes are commonly referred to as 'ibaadaat and mu'aamalaat, respective-
ly.
72. See generally THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (1993) (describing hadd crimes
as having a specific source in the Qur'an); Aly Aly Mansour, Hudud Crimes, in THE
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sidered hadd crimes by many, if not most, Islamic jurists. The
ambiguity in regard to apostasy is that, as will be seen, the punishment
is not defined in the Qur'an, only the crime.
All other crimes, or crimes which cannot meet the high evidentiary
requirements necessary for a hadd conviction,' are tried as tazir
crimes.7 Tazir crimes generally carry lesser penalties and accept the
necessity of deference to the power and discretion of temporal rulers.'
It may be that as Iran's head of state Khomeini was simply acting to
enforce a tazir penalty, which is more open to discretionary interpreta-
tion. Khomeini and the Iranian Government, however, have said that the
fatwa was a religious edict separate from Khomeini's political power.
Thus, one would expect it to be bound by Islamic and Shi'a legal pre-
cedents.76 In any case, as a tazir punishment is often defined as less
than that of a hadd, it is not normally punishable by death.' There is
a great diversity of opinion on exactly what the appropriate punishments
ISLAMIC JUSTICE SYSTE, (1982) (describing hadd crimes); ANWVAR AHmAD QADRI, IS-
LA.MIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD (1973) (providing references to hadd
crimes).
73. See QADRi, supra note 72, at 272 (discussing proof requirements for hadd
offenses). Islamic law rarely inflicted death as punishment for hadd offenses. Id.
Death punishments for offenses against "public morality, decency and the like" also
required proof offered by four male witnesses. Id.; see MATrHmv LihPANN Er AL.,
ISLAMIC CR M NAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 65 (1988) (noting the debate among jurists
over whether a defendant in a trial for a hadd offense has a right to counsel). Jurists,
however, are in virtual agreement that such right to counsel exists for a defendant
tried of a tazir offense. Id
74. Ghauouti Benmelha, Ta'azir Crimes, in THE ISLAMC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM (1982) (discussing tazir crimes).
75. See Rudolf Peters, Valuing Life: Equality and Equivalence of Human Beings
in Islamic Criminal Law, Lecture at The Netherlands Institute, Cairo, Egypt (Feb. 8.
1996) (stating that death for the taking of a life is accepted as a legitimate punish-
ment in an Islamic legal system). This is not classed as hadd, but jinayat as its
punishment is discretionary. The principle of the sanctity of life is not absolute, but
is in tension with the notion of retribution which puts a relative value on an
individual's life, depending on religion, gender, whether free or slave, embryonic or
not.
76. See Kamal Kharazi, Ambassador of Iran to the United Nations, Statement at
the Middle East Insight Breakfast Symposium in Washington, D.C., available in FED-
ERAL NEws SERVICE, 1993 WL 94267646 (Apr. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Kharazi State-
ment] (stating that Khomeini issued the Rushdie fatva not as the political leader of
Iran, but as a high-ranking and well-respected Islamic scholar).
77. See ABDUR RAHIM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MUHAMMtADAN JURISPRUDENCE 363
(1911) (indicating that the punishments for tazir offenses range from warnings and
fines to corporal punishment and imprisonment).
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are for tazir crimes. Abd Allah ibn Qudama, a Hanbali jurist from the
1200s, is fairly typical when he says that punishment for tazir "is by
flogging, imprisonment and reprimand. It is not permissible to amputate
any part of him, or to wound him, or to take his property."'
In a booklet released by the Iranian Mission to the United Nations,
subtitled "A Brief on the Imam's Verdict: Its Legal Foundations,"
Rushdie's actual crime-which is certainly a legal foundation-is also
quite elusive.79 The pamphlet is more explicit than Khomeini's fatwa
only in the following:
in the Rushdie instance, we have a blasphemous campaign at whose dis-
posal are hundreds of western publishing houses which seek to circulate
this book .... The whole affair goes beyond Rushdie's foul and filthy
language, it is looming as an international plot premeditatively patronized
by world Zionism and imperialism to smear the Prophet's image."
In a later speech, Khomeini was again quite vague in his accusations
against Rushdie, but also mentioned blasphemy as an issue: "the issue
of The Satanic Verses is that it is a calculated move aimed at rooting
out religion .... God wanted the blasphemous book of The Satanic
Verses to be published now, so that the world of conceit, arrogance, and
barbarism would bare its true face in its long held enmity to Islam."'"
If blasphemy is indeed the crime under Islamic legal norms, it would
not justify a death sentence.82 It would subject Rushdie to the death
penalty only if used as proof of Rushdie's apostasy (riddah), a hadd
crime which is punishable by death. 3 Rushdie's statement that "where
there is no belief there is no blasphemy," is thus answered by insisting
that Rushdie cannot so easily shrug off the bonds of religious commu-
nity. Indeed, the Iranian Mission's pamphlet refers, without explanation,
78. Muwaffaq al-Din Abu Muhammad 'Abd Allah ibn Qudama (d 630 Hejira,
1231 CE), al-Mughni.
79. THE VERDICr OF ISLAM: SALMAN RusHDiE's SATANiC VERSES: A BRIEF ON
THE IMAM'S VERDICT: ITS LEGAL FOUNDATIONS (pamphlet distributed by the Iranian
Mission to the United Nations) [hereinafter THE VERDICT OF ISLAM] (photocopy on
file in offices of AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).
80. Id.
81. See THE RusHi-i FILE, supra note 2, at 74 (providing the text of the Aya-
tollah Khomeini's Feb. 23, 1989 message).
82. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (1993) (see entry murtad).
83. See LIPPMANN, supra note 73, at 85 (stating that "the death penalty should
be inflicted only when one of three crimes is committed: (1) apostasy; (2) a deliber-
ate homicide; and (3) an illicit sexual act, including sexual acts outside the institution
of marriage").
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to Rushdie as an apostate.' The Iranian Ambassador to the United Na-
tions also explicitly confirmed that apostasy was the charge." Thus, in
order to make Rushdie's death sentence coherent within the constructs
of the Islamic legal system, one must proceed in the convoluted manner
of first construing Khomeini's fatwa as implicitly accusing Rushdie of
blasphemy, which in turn serves as proof of apostasy, for which a sen-
tence of death is admissible.
1. Blasphemy
While apostasy seems to be the legal charge against Rushdie, there is
little doubt that the outrage over The Satanic Verses is based less on
this precise charge and more in anger over blasphemous statements in
The Satanic Verses. In Islamic law, blasphemy comes under two catego-
ries: zindiqa and sabb al-rasul (or sabb an-nabi). Zindiqa indicates free-
thinking, atheism, or heresy which, if expressed publicly, is considered
scandalous and menacing.' Sabb al-rasul, translated literally, means
insult of the prophet, and is a matter taken extremely seriously in the
Islamic world. In fact sabb al-rasul is, in terms of Islamic law, a more
straightforward charge against Rushdie, though it is apostasy which the
Iranian Government has settled on as the basis of Khomeini's fanwa.
Any mockery of Muhammad or of Allah is considered blasphemous and
it is this deeply felt sensitivity that explains the apparently widely held
feelings of disgust for The Satanic Verses among Muslims. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the translation of the term blasphemy to sabb
al-rasul is somewhat problematic. Muhammad is not divine, thus an
attack on him is distinct from the English language's sense of the term
and closer to an insult of the very fiber which holds the Islamic com-
munity together.
The Encyclopedia of Islam says of zindiqa that "the term is explained
by its political character, it brands the heresy which imperils the Muslim
state." Heresy indicates a split from and attempt to subvert the com-
munity of believers. With the Islamic norm of the religious and political
84. THE VEDICT OF IsLAM, supra note 79, at 3, 5.
85. Ambassador Kamal Kharazi, Statement at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy
(Oct. 12, 1994) (transcript available in offices of AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).
86. See GLAssE, supra note I, at 433 (defining a zindiqa as a "freethinker, athe-
ist . . or heretic").
87. Id. Muslim society tolerates heresy and atheism so long as such beliefs are
privately held. Id. Muslim society will, however, consider publicly-expressed heresy a
"scandal and a menace to society," and punishable as such. Id.
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community's close alignment, this has more than just an individual,
religious significance. For a Muslim state, zindiqa is also deeply politi-
cal, indicating seditious religious teachings.88 Because the legitimacy of
the state is often deeply tied to Islam, an attack on religion is also an
attack on the state.
There are echoes of zindiqa in the Rushdie affair. Rushdie was bitter-
ly attacked by South Asian Muslims because he was considered a traitor
to the community.89 One who had been a hero-not only successful
and famous, but willing to stand up politically for South Asians-now
joined those who mocked their culture and beliefs.' As previously
mentioned, the political equation was somewhat more complicated in
Iran, but it sprang from a similar sense that the individual literary and
religious expression of Rushdie had a political aspect. This time, how-
ever, the attack was not just against the religious community, but against
a religious community that had aligned its beliefs with those of the
state. The reaction, thus, not only called for Rushdie's death, but
brought the Iranian state's punitive apparatus to bear on its pursuit.
88. BERNARD LEwis, IsLAM IN HISTORY: IDEAS, PEOPLE, AND EvENTs IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 285-87 (1993).
89. See William E. Smith, The New Satans; As the West Wakes Up, Khomeini
Confirms that the Real Fight is in Iran, TIME, Mar. 6, 1989, at 36 (explaining that
in the weeks following the issuance of the fatwa, 10,000 anti-Rushdie protestors rioted
in Bombay, India, leaving 13 dead and over 70 wounded).
90. In a sense, this shock is paralleled by Rushdie's surprise at the real hurt
caused by The Satanic Verses. His use of a vernacular of obscenity and
deconstructive abuse in regard to Islam and Muhammad fostered a reaction that had
very little to do with the substance of Rushdie's political critique of fundamentalism
in The Satanic Verses. Most South Asian Muslim protesters in England, for example,
have evinced no particular sympathy for Shi'ism or Khomeini, and few have endorsed
the fatwa. See Salman Rushdie, Statement before the National Press Club in Washing-
ton, D.C., available in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 1993 WL 947520 (Nov. 24, 1993)
(noting lack of support of fatwa death sentence among the Muslim community in
Britain). Nonetheless, their sense of being insulted by The Satanic Verses itself re-
mains. This article, of course, is limiting itself to an analysis of the fatwa, but does
not question the validity of the righteous anger which particular Muslims may feel
toward the book and author. It is unfortunate-from both an ethical and tactical point
of view-that protesting English Muslims have not made more of a point of distanc-
ing themselves from the fatwa. While sensitivity was demanded for Muslim concerns,
little understanding was expressed of the complexity, of issues of free speech, blasphe-
my, and individual rights. See Bhikhu Parekh, The Rushdie Affair and the British
Press, in THE SALMAN RUSHDIE CONTROVERSY IN INTERRELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
(1990) (providing a related discussion).
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The difficulty in even pinning down the charge against Rushdie indi-
cates the rather shaky ground on which the fanva is based and explains
the discomfort which Iranian officials have in explaining it.9 This
discomfort is increased by the procedural requirement of convening an
Islamic tribunal and passing a verdict before the issuance of a death
sentence.' A hadd offense must be proven to the point of shubha, or
beyond doubt.' While a legal opinion such as a fat'a can be issued
by any Islamic legal scholar (and contradicted by other Islamic schol-
ars), a criminal judgment requires a more formal procedure.' Theoreti-
cally, the binding effect of a fatwa comes from its acceptance in the
individual consciousness of members of the broader community. Realisti-
cally, it is based in affiliation with the punitive apparatus of a state. In
regards to Rushdie, the mufti of Egypt's al-Azhar affirmed that no Mus-
lim can be killed without a full and fair trial and that "[t]he court must
ask for the writer to explain his intentions and not be limited by
misreadings and misunderstandings." 5 The mufti added that if found
guilty, Rushdie could seek forgiveness."
2. Sunni vs. Shi'a Islam and the fatwa
The fact of an Egyptian Sunni mufti criticizing the fatwa of an Irani-
an Shi'a Ayatollah raises questions regarding Sunni-Shi'a relations. One
of the peculiar facts about Khomeini's fanva is that it attempts to bridge
91. See Kharazi Statement, supra note 76 (responding to questions regarding the
validity of Khomeini's fatwa); see also Europe Defends Rushdie, FIN. TIMES. June 8,
1995, at 1 (reporting statement of an Iranian reformer, Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi,
that the "fatwa against Rushdie is 'outside the legal system of Iran' and unenforce-
able by Iranian courts").
92. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (explaining the procedural re-
quirements prior to imposing a death sentence).
93. Muneer Ahmad, Radicalism in Orthodoxy's Clothing: A Legal and Historical
Analysis of Apostasy 20 (1993) (Thesis, Harvard University).
94. See Louis MASSIGNON, THE PASSION OF AL-HALLA. (1994) (referring to the
trial of al-Hallaj, the great Sufi mystic who declared "I am God" in a defiant expres-
sion of the oneness of God's universe, which took a full 10 years to complete). Per-
haps Khomeini's Islam is not traditional enough.
95. Letter from Cairo, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 3, 1989, reprinted in THE RusHDIE
FILE, supra note 2.
96. Id.; see PIPES, supra note 46, at 93 (noting that critics of Khomeini's edict
claimed that it violated Islamic. law). Abdullah al-Mushidd, head of al-Azhar's Fatwa
council insisted that "[w]e must try the author in a legal fashion for Islam does not
accept killing as a legal instrument." Id.
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the Sunni-Shi'a gap. The popular protest to which Khomeini reacted
came from Sunni locales,' and in responding Khomeini seemed to hold
himself out as a universal leader of Muslims. While it is not so peculiar
that a Shi'a cleric would speak out on an issue of concern to Sunni
Muslims, it is odd that he would conduct himself as an authority to all
Muslims. Such conduct was most offensive to Sunni clerics, who were
also affiliated with competing Muslim states such as Egypt, Saudi Ara-
bia, and the Sudan.
In terms of law, however, Shi'a jurisprudence is not dramatically
different than Sunni jurisprudence. Moojan Momen notes that "[i]n most
of its legal and juristic forms and practices, Twelver Shi'ism was two
centuries or more behind Sunni Islam and tended to follow the latter
very closely."'9 The fundamental difference between the two groupings
is the Shi'a investing of charismatic authority in a line of Imams' and
the greater degree of formal hierarchization of the Shi'a ulama, which
gives the Shi'a ulama a greater ability to institutionally mobilize behind
particular religious-political "truths."'" This helps explain Khomeini's
ability to create a temporarily unified revolutionary Islamic community.
After his ascent to power, Khomeini worked to further this institutional-
ization and hierarchization of the Iranian Shi'a ulama by melding the
Iranian Government bureaucracy with the traditional clerisy. This under-
pinned Khomeini's rather unprecedented assertion of the right to speak
on behalf of all Muslims, which runs counter to the decentralized orga-
nization of Islam's clerisy-particularly among Sunnis-with its focus
on individual conscience rather than hierarchical edict as the basis for
establishing religious authority.'
A more particular distinction between Shi'a and Sunni schools which
is of relevance to this affair is the issue of whether an apostate can
repent. Sunnis tend to allow such repentance, contrary to Shi'a practice,
97. See Sheila Rule, Iranians Protest Over Banned Book, N.Y. TilvIES, Feb. 16,
1989, at Al (reporting violent protests by Muslims in India and Pakistan over the
release of The Satanic Verses).
98. MOMEN, supra note 10, at 184.
99. Id.
100. See GLASSE, supra note 1, at 407 (stating that Shi'ite ulamas can make legal
determinations and are a "more direct and independent political force than the ulama
of the Sunni world").
101. See Arjomand, supra note 3, at 97 (emphasizing the fact that the
"hierocratic" authority of the Shi'ite jurists was more firmly entrenched in Iran than
in Sunni majority states such as Pakistan, thus facilitating Iran's transition in merging
the religious and political orders of the state).
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as expressed by Khomeini."°z The Shi'a practice, however, is fraught
with contradiction, as came to the surface rather dramatically when All
Khamenei, then president of Iran, indicated three days after the original
fatwa was issued that, if Rushdie repented, the fatwa could be lifted.'"
Khomeini immediately repudiated Khamenei's statement, saying that
"[s]hould Salman Rushdie repent and become the most pious sage of all
times, it still remains obligatory upon all the Muslims to devote their
lives and possessions to the task of [ending Rushdie's life and] sending
him to the lowest state of Hell."' 4
3. The Crime of Apostasy
This brings us back to another basic but essential issue: what is apos-
tasy? According to which Islamic sources is apostasy a crime? What are
the legal results which flow from apostasy? The apparently firm edict
that "there will be no compulsion in religion" would indicate that apos-
tasy is a matter between an individual and God, not determinable in an
earthly legal order. The following two Qur'anic verses define apostasy,
indicating that it calls for otherworldly punishment rather than earthly
legal sanction:
Whosoever denies having once believed-unless he is forced to do so
while his heart enjoys the peace of faith-and opens his mind to disbelief
will suffer the wrath of God. Their punishment will be great .... They
will surely be losers in the life to come."~
Those who accept the faith, then disbelieve, then return to it, and deny
once again and increase in disbelief, will not be forgiven by God or be
guided by Him. Give tidings to the hypocrites that painful is their
doom."°
The primary basis for the condemnation of apostates comes from
ahadith,"°7 most explicitly the above-quoted tradition that "whomsoever
102. KHOMMN,, PRAC'rcAL LAWS OF ISLAM (1983). See generally THE ENCYCI.O-
PEDIA OF IsLAM (1993) (providing varied opinions of Islamic jurists on the issue).
103. William E. Smith, The New Satans; As the West Wakes Up, Khomeini Con-
firms that the Real Fight is in Iran, TME, Mar. 6, 1989, at 36.
104. IL
105. Sura 16:106-09, reprinted in AL, supra note 7.
106. Sura 4:137-38, reprinted in All, supra note 7.
107. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IsLAM (1993) (defining hadith as a "Mradition,
being an account of what the Prophet said or did, or of his tacit approval of some-
thing said or done in his presence").
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changes religion, kill him."' 8 Other ahadith evince a similar sentiment.
For example: "[b]lood of any Muslim is unlawful, except for one of
three, the married adulterer, life for a life, and the one who leaves his
religion dividing the community."'"19
It is worth noting that the Sunna"---made up of "valid" ahadith-is
a source of law equivalent in religious force to the Qur'an. The Qur'an
is not normally seen as superior to the Sunna, rather the two are seen as
integral coequals that theoretically cannot contradict each other. Thus,
Rushdie's defenders point out that the Qur'anic Suras would deny the
validity of a death sentence on an apostate. While Rushdie's accusers
would argue the traditional view that the Qur'an simply did not define
the punishment, a gap duly filled by the Sunna." The Sunna and long
history confirm that, in purely Islamic legal terms, sentencing an apos-
tate to death is legitimate.
Like zindiqa, apostasy has clear political overtones. Riddah, or
apostasy, literally means "turning away." Islamic history tells of the
"Apostasy Wars," the fight against the secession of Arab tribes from Is-
lam and the budding Islamic empire after Muhammad's death."' Just
as the Greek root of apostasy means "defection" or "revolt,""' riddah
also has a clear implication of defection to an enemy camp, as it was
believed Rushdie had done.
The difficulty is that by all evidence, including Khomeini's fatwa,
Rushdie was not sentenced (or even put on trial according to Islamic
standards of procedure and evidence) for apostasy. This charge would
seem to be an ex post facto rationalization by the Iranian Govern-
ment."4 In fact, Rushdie had publicly turned his back on Islam many
years before,"' without punishment or the threat thereof. He was even
108. See supra note 66.
109. See supra note 66.
110. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (1993) (defining Sunna).
Ill. Ahmad, supra note 93, at 16.
112. A. RAHIM, ISLAMIC HISTORY 57-59 (1983); see ELIAS SHAuFANI, HURUB AL-
RIDDA [The Apostasy Wars] (1995) (discussing the history of the "Apostasy Wars").
113. Kharazi Statement, supra note 76.
114. See Rushdie Death Sentence, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 10, 1990, at 4
(reporting Khamenei's statement that Rushdie's death sentence for blasphemy and
apostasy remained in effect); see also Michael Parks, Rushdie Sentence Stands, L.A.
TIMES, June 23, 1989, at 14 (providing the statement by Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker
of Iran's parliament, that the fatwa's charge of apostasy and sentence of death were
still in force).
115. See Craig R. Whitney, Rushdie Appeals for Muslim Tolerance of "Satanic
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awarded an Iranian Government literary prize for Shame, one of his
earlier books."' As Khomeini's original fatva indicates, the real moti-
vation for the sentence seems to have been to politically capitalize on
the attack on Islam embodied in The Satanic Verses. Certainly this is
the only way to account for the inclusion in the broadly phrased death
sentence of those who work for the various publishers of the book. The
imprecision of the fatwa must have been deliberate, giving a legal cover
to a political document. Khomeini was no village mullah, considering
his learning and sophistication, there is no other explanation for the
fatwa's ambiguity.
4. Reactions to the Fatwa
The fatwa, thus, can now be viewed as somewhat reckless, justifiable
only in a rather tortured fashion."7 In issuing it, Khomeini stretched
the bounds of the Islamic legal order, making it a mere servant to his
political projects and robbing it of its autonomy and integrity as moral
natural law. In the form of a legal document, Khomeini's fanwa is, in
essence, a political call to violence. This is not overly shocking, given
that those with political or religious legal authority have always sought
to use the other order for their own purposes. Khomeini's position as
the ultimate authority in both the political and religious orders, however,
made it easy for him to subvert each to his own purposes. His religious
notions were unchecked by practical political considerations, and his
political project was unchecked by a religious order concerned with
maintaining the integrity of its traditions. The ultimate question of poli-
tics-who will guard the guardians-was left unanswered.
Whether the fatwa is sustainable is an open question. Domestically,
the Islamic Republic is more flexible and more democratic than most
outsiders would believe, and certainly there is no great outrage at a
death sentence for one like Rushdie. The Rushdie affair is, however,
Verses," N.Y. TrEs, Feb. 5, 1990, at CI1 (revealing that Rushdie had not believed
in any God since he was a young adolescent).
116. See Taheri, The Man Who Sent Signals to Satan, L.A. TIMEs BOOK REvv,
May 13, 1990, at 4 (indicating that Shame won the Ayatollah Beheshti Literary Prize
in 1986). The Islamic Guidance, located in Tehran, translated and published Rushdie's
first three novels. Id. It received the literary prize from Khomeini himself.
117. Another legal justification for the fanva is that The Satanic Verses was an
act of war against Islam. This would explain, at least in part, why Khomeini included
the publishers of The Satanic Verses in the fawa, but it is not an explanation which
has been put forward by defenders of the fawa.
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emblematic of the fact that the concerns of the Shi'a clerics are no lon-
ger in synch with those of the broader population. The population may
not disagree with the fatwa per se, but the precedence of religious issues
over economics, to the point of generating economically detrimental
international reactions, is increasingly problematic. There are reports, for
example, that amid general economic decline and pressure for political
reform, Khomeini's successors are having difficulty sustaining popular
support for their rule."' The Economist Intelligence Unit states that
"[d]emonstrations against food shortages and obvious public apathy at
government-organized rallies indicate growing discontent throughout the
country.""' 9 The report goes on to list violent clashes in different parts
of Iran that have left at least one hundred people dead in the span of
one year.'2°
Despite such reports, it is impossible to speculate with any authority
on the future of the Islamic Republic. The rule of the clerics is on
shakier ground than during their revolutionary heyday. But for now the
clerics ideological legitimacy stands, bolstered by the institutional appa-
ratus of the state.'' Until this legitimacy falters, the fatwa which it
supports (and which reciprocally supports it) will also stand. It is fair to
say, however, that since taking power Iran's clerical ruling class has
repeatedly faced the practical difficulties of realizing Khomeini's project
of a divine natural law order on earth, be it in exporting its revolution,
having to swallow the "bitter pill" of peace with the "satanic" Saddam
Hussein," failing entirely in fulfilling the economic promises of the
118. See Charles P. Wallace, Uncertain Political, Fiscal Outlook Ten Years After
Revolution, Iran Still Deeply Divided, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1989, at I (discussing
political unrest since the revolution of 1979); Geneive Abdo, Iranian Revolution Yield
to Pragmatism-Mullahs Must Deal With Outside World, Restless Population, CHI.
TRIB., July 8, 1994, at 1 (assessing the current conflicts between Iran's religious
rulers and the country's populace).
119. Iran Political Scene, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT CoUNTRY REPORTS,
(Aug. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Iran Political Scene].
120. Id.
121. See Around the World, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Oct. 12, 1995, at A18 (re-
counting the testimony of senior C.I.A. official John Gannon before the Senate Bank-
ing Committee that the current Iranian regime, despite economic problems, had a firm
grip of power in Iran and was expected to maintain it for at least the next three
years).
122. See Robert Pear, Khomeini Accepts "Poison" of Ending the War With Iraq,
N.Y. TPMEs, July 21, 1988, at Al (explaining that Khomeini found the cease-fire with
Iraq particularly difficult to accept because it left Saddam Hussein in power, and it
was a set-back for Khomeini's revolutionary model of expansion to other Islamic
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revolution, or in transforming Iran into an ideal Islamic society. In the
long term, the religious order may sacrifice its religious integrity and
popular legitimacy as a result of these failures. This explains why many
religious orders are hesitant to play too direct a role in the political
sphere.
There is no doubt that the international legal order has already made
Iran pay a certain price for having overstepped its bounds in the
Rushdie affair, as well as in other incidents (i.e., extraterritorial assassi-
nations of Iranian immigrants, arming of groups like Hizbollah). This
price has affected the domestic lives of Iranians, and possibly contribut-
ed to their rising discontent. Mainly due to pressure from the United
States, Iran has been subject to breaches in diplomatic relations,"
bans on arm sales, 4 and most importantly, restrictions on trade'
and a ban on IMF loans.'" There are members of the Iranian leader-
ship, including President Rafsanjani, who would apparently like to re-
verse this ostracization in order to focus on improving Iran's econo-
my.1  Ultimately, however, political and legal legitimacy are still tied
to the charismatic authority of Khomeini, to which supporters of radical-
ism can appeal from their entrenched institutional positions.
Nonetheless, signs of a further shift to pragmatism are apparent in
Ayatollah Khamenei's recent announcement that a fatwa of a senior
jurist can be revoked after that jurist's death." This statement was up-
held by Iran's Council of Experts. The Economist Intelligence Unit
Country Report speculates that "although Ayatollah Khamenei would
states).
123. See Smith, supra note 89 (noting that countries of the Europe=a Union, Can-
ada and Sweden withdrew their top-ranking diplomats from Tehran in protest of the
Rushdie affair).
124. See Trade Ban Aims to Stem Terror Cash, THE DAILY TEuGRAPH, May 2,
1995, at 11 (reporting that the United States won an agreement among the G7 nations
to ban arms sales and restrict the sale of nuclear technology to Iran).
125. See Robin Wright, President Says He Will Ban Trade With Iran, L.A. TIIES,
May 1, 1995, at Al (discussing President Clinton's trade sanction of April 30, 1995).
126. See Peter Waldman, Turning Back- As Economy of Iran Worsens, Government
Reverts to Hard Line Radical Clerics Who Oppose Market Reforms Regain Control
Over Rafsanjani, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1994, at Al (stating that foreign governments
are "wary" of guaranteeing loans to Iran, thereby forcing the nation to borrow from
banks through short-term letters of credit).
127. See Europe Defends Rushdie, FIN. TIrMs, June 8, 1995, at 1 (revealing that
in February, 1995, Iran's ambassador to Denmark signed a document stating that Iran
had not sent anyone to assassinate Salman Rushdie, nor would it do so in the future).
128. Iran Political Scene, supra note 119.
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have some difficulty in justifying [a revocation of the fatwa] very soon,
he might, with some preparation and help from the press, be able to
frame a pragmatic argument in favour of repealing the judgment." In the
meantime, Iran has publicly stated that it would not actively attempt to
assassinate Rushdie.1
2 9
It is also noteworthy that Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini as
velayat-e-faqih3°, was denied the highest religious designation of
maraj-e-taklid"'; and therefore, was unable to unite religious and polit-
ical authority in the same manner as Khomeini.' This is part of an
accelerating process in which Iran's political and religious leaders may
be growing apart. Lamis Adoni, for example, reports "a growing
trend ... to limit the authority of the religious leaders over the political
establishment."'33 Roy Mottahedeh paints a similar picture, but with a
slightly different spin.' Mottahedeh explains that a section of the
Shi'a religious elite is deliberately distancing itself from involvement in
everyday Iranian politics.'35 This aloofness seems to indicate that this
religious elite hopes to avoid the taint of an increasingly unpopular
government.'36 It could be that the practical difficulties of merging re-
ligious and political institutions are leading to a re-emergence of the
traditional split between the two. '
129. See EIU COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 51.
130. See Hamid Enayat, Khumayani's Concept of Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,
in ISLAM IN THE POLrTCAL PROCESS (1983) (defining velayat-e-faqih).
131. See GLASSE, supra note 1, at 259 (defining the term as the Grand Ayatollah
or a religious authority of the first rank).
132. See Lamis Adoni, Iranians Open Debate on Khomeini's Legacy, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 5, 1995, at 1 (discussing the political leaders, including
Khamenei, who followed Khomeini). In a compromise, Khamenei was allowed the
designation of Grand Ayatollah outside of Iran, but not within Iran. Id. The honor of
such a designation is debatable.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Roy Mottahedeh, The Islamic Movement: The Case for Democratic Inclusion,
in CONTENTION (1995).
135. Id. Mottahedeh attributes the denial of Ayatollah Khamenei's Grand Ayatollah
designation to an attempt to distance the highest clergy from an emerging class of
"political" clergy, i.e., the lower class of clergy who remain involved in day-to-day
politics. Id.
136. See Adoni, supra note 132 (discussing possible theories for the religious
elite's recent isolationism).
137. See Arjomand, supra note 3, at 49 (discussing the traditional separation be-
tween religious and political Islamic institutions). "It would not be an exaggeration to
say that the contemporary clerical constitution-makers of Iran are the first established
Muslim authorities to feel the urgent need to reconcile the fundamental concepts of
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5. The Jurisdictional Issue
At the heart of Iran's international problems lies the question: on
what basis could Khomeini claim jurisdiction over Salman Rushdie?
This is perhaps the most controversial point of the Rushdie affair. With-
in Iran's domestic jurisdiction, banning Rushdie's book or even prose-
cuting him, frankly, would have received no more attention than other
human rights violations of its type that occur in Iran. The Islamic Re-
public has censored many Iranian authors and even sentenced two to
death (later commuted to imprisonment) for their writings."
Rushdie and his publishers, however, are neither in the secular law
jurisdiction of Iran, nor in the religious law jurisdiction of the dar al-
Islam."9 It is not clear on which of these jurisdictional bases
Khomeini made his decision, is also not clear on what basis Khomeini
could claim the right to extend the reach of his fatwa beyond the bor-
ders of either of these jurisdictions." ° Traditionally, Islamic law does
not claim universal jurisdiction. Muslims in the dar al-Harb are under
the jurisdiction of their state of residence.
In fact, Islamic law recognizes the sovereign equality of Muslim and
non-Muslim states.' Ibn Khaldun describes this sovereign equality as
follows: "no [external] power can enforce its will upon an independent
sovereign."" Hamidullah clarifies that "it is the right of a State to ad-
minister all of its internal and external affairs in such a way that it is
neither controlled nor interfered with by a foreign power."'' In terms
the Greek science of politics with the Islamic sacred law (shar'a), as the public
representation of transcendent justice in Islam." Id.
138. See M.M. Slaughter, The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy. Honor, and Free-
dom of Speech, 79 VA. L. REV. 153 (1993) (discussing the censorship of other Irani-
an authors).
139. See KHADDURI, supra note 32, at 155 (defining dar al-Islam as pmaining to
the Muslim Community to which one belongs). Rushdie and his publishers resided in
England. THE RUSHDmE FILE, supra note 2.
140. See Bahar, supra note 4, at 145 (recognizing how Islamic culture and politics
have clashed with the existing world order and that the relationship between
Khomeinism and international law is unclear).
141. See Bahar, supra note 4, at 190 (discussing the relation of an Islamic state
to the international order).
142. MUHAmAD HAMIDULLAH, MusLai CoNDuCt OF STATE 126 (1977) (citing
iBN-KHALDuN PROLEGO MENA).
143. Id. at 126. The Qur'anic basis of this attitude comes from Suras which imply
that sovereignty is given by God and should not be overthrown by man: "0 Lord of
all dominions,/You give whom it pleases You the kingdom/and You take away from
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of a Muslim who lives in a foreign land, the individualistic focus of
Islamic law enjoins that that person observe Islamic law wherever he
is." Nonetheless, "a sharp distinction is made between jurisdiction of
a Muslim court and that of a foreign court over a Muslim, on the one
hand, and moral obligations on the other; and they do not hold him
responsible in a Muslim court for acts done in a foreign territory." Ac-
cording to a hadith, the Prophet prescribed that "[w]hoever commits
murder or fornication or theft in the territory of the enemy and came
[on that territory] with permission .... will not be tried for what he
committed in enemy territory."'45
Thus, Islamic legal traditions do not grant Khomeini legal jurisdiction
over Rushdie. Similarly, in the secular international order, absent appro-
priate reciprocal extradition arrangements, which do not exist with the
United Kingdom for a "crime" of Rushdie's sort, Iran does not have
criminal enforcement jurisdiction over Rushdie.
Iran's Khorad 15 Foundation, a group linked with the Iranian Govern-
ment, took steps to enforce the fatwa in other countries. The Foundation
even offered a two million dollar bounty for the death of Rushdie."
This attempt to extend the fatwa's reach moved the fatwa from a dis-
turbing proclamation to an incitement to murder a citizen of another
state. This violated the fundamental international legal order principles
of the territorial integrity of states and limits on prescriptive jurisdic-
tion, 47 and forced countermeasures by Britain, the United States, and
some European countries." Although there was clearly equivocation in
these measures, they have harmed Iran's limping economy and its isolat-
ed foreign policy.'49 As a result, Rafsanjani faces a conundrum: to bol-
ster public support, he needs more trade and aid with the United States
whosoever You will;/You exalt whom You please and debase whom you will." Sura
3:26, reprinted in ALI, supra note 7.
144. See KHADDURI, supra note 32, at 147 (explaining that Muslim law binds
individuals not territories; therefore, followers must adhere to the laws wherever they
are).
145. Id. at 108 (quoting from Sharh as-Siyar al-Kabir by Sarakhisy).
146. See W.J. WEATHERBY, SALMAN RusHDiE: SENTENCED TO DEATH 155 (1990)
(describing the bounty offered by the Khorad 15 Foundation for Rushdie's death). The
reward would drop to one million dollars if a non-Muslim accomplished the task. Id.
147. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 402(1) (limiting a state's jurisdiction to
prescribe law to its own territory); U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (protecting nations from the
"existence of any threat to the peace").
148. THE RUSHDJE LETTERS 130 (Steve MacDonough ed., 1993).
149. See id. at 134 (discussing the impact of the Rushdie affair on Iran's interna-
tional and domestic situation).
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and Europe, but to do so he must reign in radical domestic elements
who in the past have enjoyed strong popular support and who maintain
a strong institutional position within Iran.
The essentially political nature of the fatwa had another important
consequence: it made many Islamic scholars feel uneasy with the ver-
dict. The lack of a clearly expressed crime, lack of an official tribunal,
disregard of Islamic procedural safeguards, disregard of the right to
repentance, and overexpansion of its jurisdictional claim make the fanva,
at best, quite novel in terms of Islamic law, and at worst, illegitimate.
The Iranian Ayatollah Gandjeih has termed it "essentially anti-religious
and even inhuman."'" The Organization of Islamic States carefully dis-
tanced itself from endorsing the death sentence before a full trial was
held, as did the leading clerics of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and, perhaps
most notably, Hasan al-Turabi of the Sudan.' Turabi is perhaps the
world's prime exponent of politicized Islam, but one whose writings and
speeches emphasize the theoretical necessity of coexistence with other
political and religious orders-though the current controversies swirling
around the Sudan tell a very different story. The Islamic legal norm of
not extending its jurisdiction out of the dar al-Islam is a self-imposed
limitation on its political order, one that reflects a recognition of Islam's
inevitable coexistence with other societies." Khomeini discarded this
precedent, but it has since become increasingly clear that, in the long
term, his deviance from Islamic norms is not sustainable.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The reservations expressed about Khomeini's fanva within the Islamic
legal tradition raise the question of the legitimacy, in any legal order, of
Iran's refusal to honor its treaty obligations by claiming the higher
validity of divine law obligations." In fact, according to a number of
150. Ayatollah Djalal Gandjeih, For Rushdie, in FOR RusHDmE 150 (1994).
151. See PIPES, supra note 46, at 133-34, 142-46 (discussing the various political
positions taken on the fawa). It should be noted that, while many criticized procedur-
al aspects of the fatwa, relatively few criticized the call to ban The Satanic Verses.
Of course, the assassination of the leader of the Islamic Sunni community of Bnussels
after he publicly questioned the religious validity of the fan'a may have had some-
thing to do with quelling dissent.
152. See KHADDURI, supra note 32, at 155 (discussing Islam's recognition of its
jurisdictional limits).
153. See id. at 202 (explaining that Islamic law permit treaties and "'it is not
considered inconsistent with Islam's ultimate objective if a peace treaty is concluded
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Qur'anic Suras, treaty obligations are a part of God's law, even above
solidarity with fellow Muslim communities. For example, one Qur'anic
Sura reads "[i]n case they ask for your help in the name of faith, you
are duty bound to help them, except against a people with whom you
have a treaty.
''" 54
There are other Suras and ahadith along similar lines,' and accord-
ing to Majid Khadduri, "[t]he jurists' agreement, constituting an ijma, in
addition to the early practice of the caliphs, rendered treaty-making an
integral part of the sharia."'56 Khadduri adds that:
[o]nce the treaty is concluded Muslim authorities are strict in regard to
the necessity of living up to its terms. The Qur'an urges the Muslims not
to break oaths after making them ... Thus the principle pacta sunt
servanda is inherent in the conception of aqd [treaty) and is recognized
by all Muslim jurist-theologians.'
57
As mentioned previously, Iran is a party, without reservation, to the
ICCPR and seems to be in violation of one if not more of its arti-
cles.'58 Does Iran have the authority under the international legal order
and the treaties to which it is a party to ban a book and sentence its
author to death without a trial? Does Iran have the right to enforce such
a judgment outside of its domestic legal sphere?
A. IRAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES OF THE FATWA
The first question to pose in this regard is whether the Iranian Gov-
ernment is responsible for the legal results and any violations that flow
from the fatwa. If a religious leader who has governmental powers
issues a call for banning a book and a death sentence against the author,
and also calls for the deaths of others who facilitate his work, is this a
governmental act?
Clearly, Khomeini's pronouncements were treated as government
policy, not matters of purely religious content. Of course, in the Islamic
with the enemy").
154. Sura 8:72, reprinted in Au, supra note 7.
155. See id. at 9:4 (stating "[s]o announce to those who deny the truth the news
of painful punishment, except those idolaters with whom you have a treaty, who have
not failed you in the least, nor helped anyone against you. Fulfill your obligations to
them during the term of the treaty").
156. KHADDURI, supra note 32, at 203.
157. Id. at 204.
158. ICCPR, supra note 25; see infra pp. 414-26 (describing the relevant articles
of the ICCPR implicated by the fatwa).
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Republic, the line between these two categories is indistinct. A procla-
mation by the President of Iran that the fatwa was irrevocable"9 and a
reaffirmation of the fatwa by the Iranian Parliament" confirms that
the government of Iran can be held internationally accountable for this
action.
The international law of state responsibility also holds states answer-
able for the acts or omissions of their agents or organs.' If the
Khorad 15 Foundation is effectively linked to parts of the Iranian Gov-
ernment and deemed its agent, then the Iranian Government can be held
accountable for the foundation's offer of a two million dollar bounty for
the killing of Rushdie. In fact, the Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, the personal
representative of Ayatollah Khamenei, presides over the Foundation."
As a result of Sanei's position in the Foundation, Iranian state responsi-
bility emerges from the Foundation's actions.
Even if the Khorad 15 Foundation is not acting as an agent of the
Iranian Government, Iran is responsible for not prohibiting the
Foundation's actions that contradict the state's positive law duty to
ensure the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR. According to Donna
Sullivan, "a state violates its affirmative duty [under the ICCPR] to
ensure these rights if it does not: establish adequate legal protections
against violations by its agents or by non-state actors; make good faith
efforts to investigate violations when they occur and seek to punish
those responsible; and to provide reparations to victims."'" By this
standard, and given that Iran has at least acquiesced to Khorad 15's
actions, Iran can be held responsible for any violations committed by
Khorad 15.
159. See Carmel Bedford, Fiction, Fact and the Fatva, in THE RUSHDIE LzrERs,
supra note 148, at 48.
160. Id. at 178.
161. Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights
Law, in WomEN's RIGHrS, HumAN RIGHTS 126-34 (Judy Peters & Andrea Wolper
eds., 1995).
162. Statement by International Fellowship of Reconciliation before the ECOSOC
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Aug.
17, 1993.
163. Sullivan, supra note 161, at 130; see Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
TEXTBOOK 125-42 (A. Eide et al. eds., 1995) (providing more on the so-called "tri-
partite structure" of ensuring human rights--respect, protect, assist and fulfill).
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B. ARTICLE 19 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Of the rights protected in the ICCPR, it is the right of free expression
under Article 19 which the Rushdie affair puts most obviously in ques-
tion."M Iran's ban on The Satanic Verses clearly violated Article 19's
protection of "the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media." 65 There is,
however, no absolute right to free speech. The right to free speech must
be balanced against competing rights, such as the right to protection
from libel or slander, the right to protection from immediate physical
danger resulting from speech, the right to protection from obscenity, and
the right not to hear speech that causes social strife. None of these
limits are unique to the Islamic world.'" The United States, in fact, is
much more exceptional in its relatively absolutist position regarding free
speech. Most other countries move the balance away from such a posi-
tion toward greater protections of countervailing individual and com-
munity interests. These protections range from Canada's regulation of
hate speech, to Germany's banning of certain ideological groups' speech,
to Israel's prohibition on defamation of religious belief.'67
Article 19 is a derogable right in "times of national emergency threat-
ening to the life of the nation.""'6 Limitations to Article 19 are based
on respect of rights and reputations of others, and protection of "nation-
al security," "public order," "public health," and "morals."' 69 Public
order and morals are the strongest justification for Iran's ban on The
Satanic Verses.
In terms of "public order," Iran can cite the violent reactions publica-
tion of the book aroused in the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan as
justification for the banning of The Satanic Verses.'70 Prima facie, the
164. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 19(2).
165. Id.
166. See ODIO BENIrO, HUMAN RIGHTS STUDiES SERIES No. 2, ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF INTOLERANCE AND DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION OR BELIEF
para. 15 (1989) (stating that Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Iraq, Jordan, Mada-
gascar, Mauritius, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, and Syria have laws
which prohibit the "defamation of a religion or belief, or of its members or leader-
ship individually or collectively by ridicule or scorn, contempt or insulting language").
167. Id. at 144-45.
168. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 4.
169. Id. art. 19(3).
170. See THE RUSHDiE FILE, supra note 2, at 66 (describing reactions to
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possibility of riots in Iran could serve as a reasonable public order justi-
fication, given the precedent for significant disturbances in public order
as a result of the book's publication.'
However, while an absolute consensus of what constitutes a threat to
public order has yet to emerge from international decisions, the Siracusa
Principles do provide a widely accepted definition. It states that "the
expression 'public order (ordre public),' as used in the Covenant may be
defined as the sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or
the set of fundamental principles on which society is founded. Respect
for human rights is part of the public order (ordre public)."' '
By this definition, Iran's banning of The Satanic Verses is not justifi-
able under the public order limitation. While the book may have violent-
ly angered some, there is no reason to suspect (nor would Iran likely
concede) that it presented a threat to the "functioning of society" or its
fundamental principles. Moreover, beyond the banning, international law
holds that the means used to restrict expression, when restriction is
justifiable, must be proportionate to the threat.' The death sentence
against Rushdie is a disproportionate response and, therefore, violates
international law.
In terms of "morals" as a basis for restricting Rushdie's right of free
expression, Iran also has a reasonable initial argument. The Satanic
Verses, virtually by Rushdie's own admission, is in some sense an at-
tack on Islam-and by extension, its moral system-as it is practiced in
Iran, as well as much of the rest of the Islamic world. Rushdie states
that The Satanic Verses "is, I profoundly hope, a work of radical dissent
and questioning and re-imagining."'7
Rushdie's "re-imaginings" are what are in question."" As Anne
Rushdie's book, including the deaths of five protestors in Pakistan).
171. See id (examining the "mounting protests" over publication of The Satanic
Verses).
172. The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights U.N. Doc. EICN.411985/4, Annex
22 [hereinafter Siracusa Principles]. The Siracusa Principles include five conditions
for a permissible restriction. The restriction must be: (1) in accordance with the law-,
(2) in the interest of a legitimate objective of general interest; (3) strictly necessary in
a democratic society; (4) imposed without a less intrusive means available; and (5)
not imposed arbitrarily. Id.
173. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 19.
174. Salman Rushdie, In Good Faith, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 15, 1990, at 4.
175. See TiOTHY BRENNAN, SALMAN RuSHDm AND THE THIMD WoVtD (1989)
(contending that The Satanic Verses is conceived as "anti.Qur'an"). In Is Nothing
Sacred?, Rushdie stated:
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Laurent points out, "en imaginant une autre version de la naissance de
l'Islam, Rushdie a attaqu6 les bases mime de l'idenitM de son
groupe."'76 These re-imaginings are made in an obscene, insulting ver-
nacular. Rushdie's "dissent" refers to the Companions of the Prophet as
"fucking clowns," identifies the Prophet's wives with whores, refers to
the Prophet as "Mahound"--a medieval Christian expression denigrating
Mohammed as an agent of the devil-and calls Mecca the city of
"Jahilia," or ignorance.'" This is somewhat different from a reasoned
questioning of orthodoxy. It is part of a deliberate strategy to shock the
values and beliefs central to Islamic morality. But is civility necessary
to dissent? Clearly, the language of Article 19 allows space for expres-
sion which does not conform to a state or a community's norms-or
else why have the right at all? The question is, how does one balance
between the right to protect such moral norms from abuse and the right
to freedom of expression, which explicitly includes artistic expression?
According to the Siracusa Principles, the limitation on grounds of
public morals must demonstrate "that the limitation in question is essen-
tial to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the commu-
nity."'78 Demonstrating that the publication of The Satanic Verses rep-
resents this level of a threat to the values of a 1,300 year-old religion is
a questionable enterprise--certainly Islam has survived much worse!
Nonetheless, human rights norms have to take account of legitimate
protections of public morality. The Siracusa Principles recognize that
"public morality varies over time and from one culture to another."'7 9
There is, thus, room for a margin of discretion for state parties.
One could, in fact, reasonably argue that The Satanic Verses was a
legitimately felt attack on Islamic morality. While in Iran the fatwa was
I have been asking myself [this question] throughout my life as a writer Can
the religious mentality survive outside of religious dogma and hierarchy? Which
is to say: Can art be the third principle that mediates between the material and
spiritual worlds; might it, by 'swallowing' both worlds, offer us something
new-something that might even be called a secular definition of transcen-
dence? I believe it can. I believe it must. And I believe that, at its best, it
does.
Salman Rushdie, Is Nothing Sacred?, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDs 420 (1992).
176. Anne Laurent, Le Passage dans les CEevres de Salman Rushdie et Philip
Roth, PhD dissertation, Universitd de Paris VH ("In imagining another version of the
birth of Islam, Rushdie attacked the foundations of the identity of his group").
177. RusrmE, supra note 5, at 359-94.
178. Siracusa Principles, supra note 172, 91 27.
179. Id.
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a top down manipulation of political sentiment by Khomeini, the origi-
nal outrage expressed in Pakistan and the United Kingdom appeared far
more genuine.'" Tariq Modood, for example, convincingly argues that
in the United Kingdom:
all the religious zealots had to do was simply quote from SV [Satanic
Verses] for anger, shame and hurt to be felt. It is important to be clear
that SV was not objected to as an intellectual critique of their faith (li-
braries are full of those); for the average Muslim the vulgar language, the
explicit sexual imagery, the attribution of lustful motives-without any
evidence--to the holy Prophet was no more a contribution to literary
discourse than pissing upon the Bible is a theological argument .... The
passion and intensity of the street demonstrations was a product of
Barelvi [a South Asian Muslim grouping who were also at the center of
the Pakistani rioting] devotionalism, which normally even other Muslims
think is excessive in the exalted status it confers on Muhammad.'
if it is sincerely believed that The Satanic Verses constitutes an attack
on Islam, how can this be balanced against the right of free expression?
While the threat to "public morals" does not seem to rise to the level
justifying an Article 19(3) limitation, such an attack can also be viewed
as a question of communal libel, based on the ICCPR's Article 20.
C. ARTICLE 20 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLrICAL RIGHTS
Article 20 holds that "any advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
shall be prohibited by law."'" Demonstrating that Article 20 has real
weight, the U.N. Human Rights Committee ruled inadmissible applica-
tions challenging convictions for racist or fascist speech in MA. v. Ita-
ly 18 and J R T and The W G Party v. Canada.'" In the wake of
World War II, the main concern of Article 20's drafters was to control
offensive racial and religious forms of expression. A restriction of free
180. See THE RUSHDIE FM.a, supra note 2, at 68 (describing the protests in Paki-
stan and the United Kingdom).
181. Tariq Modood, British Asian Muslims and the Rushdfe Affair, 60 POL Q. 154
(1990).
182. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 20.
183. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. 40,
U.N. Doe. No. A/39/40, at 130.
184. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR 38th Sess., Supp. 40,
U.N. Doe. No. A/38/40, at 231.
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expression based on hate speech or communal libel was deemed neces-
sary for the general welfare.'85
In addition to a limitation based on protecting "public order" or
"morals," Iran could also claim the Article 20 obligation to prohibit
communal libel. The definition of communal libel, however, remains
elusive. Is communal libel inflammatory speech? Offensive novels?
Blasphemy? Many Muslims demanded a ban of The Satanic Verses
because of its insulting and blasphemous nature, constituting communal
libel. From this perspective, tolerating such blasphemy would essentially
sanction it, thereby inviting additional attacks. Iran is extremely sensitive
to such perceived libel, given its political history and ideological predis-
position to pose an absolute opposition between its self-defined version
of Islamic community and all others. Perhaps more strongly, however,
the United Kingdom's Muslim community-as with many diaspora com-
munities-felt particularly beleaguered and attempted to deny Rushdie
his right, in their mind, to libel their community from within.
1. The Gay News Case
Ironically, the United Kingdom itself, Rushdie's reluctant protector,
still has a blasphemy law on its books. Under the blasphemy law, a
successful prosecution took place in Gay News v. United Kingdom.'86
The arguments in this case, virtually identical to those made by Muslims
in regard to The Satanic Verses, were applied by the United Kingdom's
House of Lords, Britain's highest appellate court'87, and accepted by
the European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR). 8 The Gay
News case was Britain's first prosecution for blasphemy in over fifty
years. The case involved a poem published in Gay News magazine,
which depicted Christ as homosexual, "well hung," and engaged in sex
with a Roman centurion after his crucifixion.8 9 On appeal, the House
185. See General Comment No. 11 (Article 20), U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/21/Rev.
1, at 10 [hereinafter General Comment 11] (finding that racial or religious hatred and
violence caused by incitement is contrary to the Charter 9 of the United Nations); see
also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (containing the
most far-reaching hate speech restriction of any international instrument). Iran is not a
signatory to CERD. Id.
186. 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1983).
187. Whitehouse v. Lemon, 1979 App. Cas. 617 (defining a blasphemous libel as
a "matter calculated to outrage the feeling of Christians").
188. Gay News v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1983).
189. James Kirkup, The Love that Dares to Speak Its Name, GAY NEws, June
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of Lords upheld the conviction. Interestingly, for a comparative per-
spective on The Satanic Verses, the decision held that a publication is
blasphemous if it "contains any contemptuous reviling, scurrilous or
ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ, or the Bible or to the
formularies of the Church of England. It is not blasphemous if... the
publication is couched in decent and temperate language. The test to be
applied is as to the manner."'"
On appeal to the ECHR as a violation of Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights regarding free expression, the application
was deemed inadmissible. "It [the ECHR] decided that the restriction
imposed upon the applicant's freedom of expression was necessary under
Article 10(2) for the protection of the rights of others. People had a
right not to be offended in their religious feelings by publications..''.
The Gay News case seems to be in line with the Human Rights
Committee's rulings sustaining the right to ban offensive forms of
speech."
Given the Gay News precedent, it seems that British Muslims had a
good case for banning the exuberantly derogatory The Satanic Verses. In
R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Choudhury,
however, British courts affirmed that British law applied only to blas-
phemy against Christianity.93 The allegations of blasphemous libel and
seditious libel against Rushdie and his publisher were, therefore, sum-
marily dismissed. The court held that even if it were free to extend the
law to cover other religions, it would not do so as it would be impossi-
ble to set clear limits on such an extension.'" The ECHR also refused
the case, saying that the United Kingdom did not violate its obligation
to protect the European Convention's rights without discrimination, and
there was no positive obligation to protect Muslims from blasphemy."'
The Gay News and Rushdie cases show a clear double-standard. Up-
holding the protections against blasphemy for individual Christians and
1976.
190. Whitehouse, 1979 App. Cas. at 661-65.
191. Kevin Boyle, Religious Intolerance and the Incitement of Hatred, in ARTIcLE
19, STRIKNG A BALANCE 67 (1992). It is worth noting that the religious discrimi-
nation inherent in an officially sanctioned national church, such as the Church of
England, has never been considered a human rights violation.
192. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
193. 3 W.L.R. 986 (1990).
194. Id.
195. Choudhury v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 17439/1990, reprinted in
12 HUM. RTs. LJ. 172 (1991).
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denying them to Muslims violates any reasonable interpretation of the
norm of nondiscrimination. A more satisfactory solution is to apply the
blasphemy law to all major religions, or (preferably) to abolish it alto-
gether.
Unfortunately, this hypocrisy was quite apparent to many British
Muslims and, politically, fed into a disaffection from British and Euro-
pean institutions. If courts-the forum for nonviolent resolution of con-
flicts-are only available on an unequal basis, it is difficult to fault
aggrieved groups for taking their protest to the streets and engaging in
provocative demonstrations designed to garner the maximum possible
attention. Perhaps it is also not surprising that they would appeal to an
outside power to intervene on their behalf, such as Iran in the Rushdie
affair. This is an example of how the protection of one particular
group's values-be they a majority or minority-can alienate other
groups from engagement in civil and political society, and reinforce
social division. This sort of alienation stimulates a reaction justifying the
most inflexible notions of communal identity.
Even if the attempt to ban The Satanic Verses was not successful in
the United Kingdom, based on the Gay News case, Iran has a fairly
reasonable defense for its ban of the book as blasphemous due to its
disparaging "manner" as well as the substance of its message. If the
ECHR accepts state sanctions on blasphemy, and also accepts that such
protections can be limited to a state's dominant group, Iran can argue
that its ban is in compliance with even the most far-reaching human
rights standards. Since the European system is commonly deemed the
world's most progressive, Iran cannot reasonably be held to a higher
standard.
This is a disquieting argument. Does Article 20 allow particular com-
munities to ban the expression of those who transgress their self-defined
notions of communal libel? If this ban is acceptable, are not punitive
sanctions on the transgressor (as with individual libel) an obvious corol-
lary? Which communities have a right to judge what constitutes such a
transgression? In a pluralist world in which most individuals have multi-
ple social identities, who will define such communities? A community's
institutions? Its most vocal, unyielding members who reject cooperation
with other communities? Who is to decide what "manner" constitutes
blasphemy?"9
196. Mary Whitehouse, who brought suit in the Gay News case, had considerably
keener sensitivities than most other British Christians. Nonetheless, she was recognized
as representing the entire community.
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Tariq Modood, an advocate of extending Britain's blasphemy law to
all religions, says "the group which feels hurt is the ultimate arbiter of
whether a hurt has taken place."' 9 Thus, it follows that a group's
most sensitive elements should have the right to call in state protection
for its perceived "hurts." Leonard Levy succinctly responds to this logi-
cal extension of notions of communal libel that "if religion ever got the
authority to decide what is blasphemous, freedom of expression would
extend as far as the intolerance of sectarianism."'" Levy goes on to
say that "[w]hat the centuries have taught should not be abandoned out
of respect for a minority religion or the feelings of its believers, any
more than out of respect for a majority religion or the feelings of its
believers."'"
Granting such "protections" to defined communities institutionalizes
division and gives power to those factions most attached to exclusive,
singular social identities, rather than those who accept the reality of
plural and diverse societies. This can result in a rigidification of com-
munal identity to the ultimate detriment of a tolerant civil society, and
the give and take necessary to free and democratic debate and discourse.
Empowering self-styled defenders of a community with extensive
legal protections, thus, may be counterproductive. Legal protections lack
the suppleness necessary to take account of the complexity of individual
and communal identities as they interact in the political arena, which is
the appropriate forum in which to mediate social conflicts. Inflexible
legal fiats imposing community rights-such as protections from com-
munal libel-value arbitrarily defined groups over the civic obligations
of the individual, the foundation of civic and democratic life. Such
community rights, thereby, work to reify group identities, repelling the
multiple and shifting identities (including the individual self) that allow
for the state to function as something other than a negotiation structure
between pre-ordained communal groups.' Whether in "individualistic"
or "communitarian" societies, individual responsibility and rights remain
the foundation of healthy communities, as well as functioning civil
societies and states7'
197. Modood, supra note 181, at 284.
198. LEONARD LEvy, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED FROM
MosEs TO SALMAN RUSHDiE 564 (1993).
199. Id. at 565.
200. For example, the extensive regime of minority rights which existed in the
former Yugoslavia.
201. All societies have some blend of individualistic and communitarian social
aspects. The dichotomy of the "individualist West" and "communitarian" Third World
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If free expression in a free society is to be meaningful, critical and
even satirical speech must be accepted. States whose individuals and
communities have different conceptions of right and wrong, appropriate
and inappropriate, must allow for mutual tolerance. There are limits on
free expression and such limits are quite necessary. Most fundamentally,
explicit calls to violence are clearly unacceptable. The interpretation of
Article 20's "incitement to discrimination, hostility or hatred," however,
must be narrowly interpreted such that it does not enter the realm where
any speech, or speaker, perceived as hurtful can be sanctioned. For legal
and political reasons, the limits on speech must be narrow and well-
defined if they are to be enforceable, and if they are not to cause more
social chaos than they prevent.
2. Other International Cases Involving Articles 19 and 20
As a matter of law, and by a reading of Articles 19 and 20, blasphe-
my as an acceptable basis for banning a book must be rejected. While
incitement is proscribed by Article 20, incitement is distinct from simple
offense or hurt.' While "The Love that Dares Speak its Name""03 or
The Satanic Verses may be offensive, it is a perversion of Article 20 to
call this incitement. A recent case considered by the European system
involving blasphemy and hate speech indicates a movement toward this
more circumscribed position.
Jersild v. Denmark concerned a Danish journalist convicted of dis-
seminating racist statements by questioning and urging on members of a
racist group in the course of a televised interview.' Given the "well-
settled European Convention jurisprudence that anti-hate speech legisla-
tion is considered a permissible limitation on the right to freedom of
expression," 5 the court's judgment was eagerly anticipated. The court
or Islamic world does not hold up to serious analysis. Even early students of the
United States, like Tocqueville, noted its fundamental basis in intermediate social
organizations. The American myth of the pure individual is just that, a myth. With its
many immigrants and ethnic groups, the notion that some abstract "West" defines the
United States--or any other country-is also a myth.
202. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 796-97 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "incite-
ment" as "that which incites or rouses to action," indicating a strong and direct con-
nection to actual deeds).
203. The poem that appeared in the Gay News magazine and gave rise to the Gay
News v. United Kingdom case.
204. Eur. Ct. H.R., Case No. 36/1993/431/510 (1994), reprinted in 15 HuM. RTs.
L. J. 361 (1994).
205. Stephanie Farrior, Landmark 'Hate Speech' Case Decided by the European
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agreed with the Commission that Jersild's conviction violated his Article
10 freedom of expression, thereby imposing a clear limit on the reach of
hate speech legislation.' Such European norms, of course, are not ap-
plicable to Iran, nor to the Rushdie affair. They do, however, indicate
that the legal impulse behind international norms of hate speech legisla-
tion has not expanded as far as some advocates might like.'
As a matter of politics, such an extension of Article 20 can have
dangerous consequences by acquiescing to, and even encouraging, a
tyranny of the majority (if tied only to a state religion) or the
balkanization of social groups if applied to arbitrarily defined minority
communities. States and groups that emphasize hate speech often do so
to advance particular political interests. By all evidence, group relations
are not improved by such regulations, well-intentioned or not. As Sandra
Colliver states:
hate speech laws either have been used to a substantial degree to suppress
the rights of government critics and other minorities or else have been
used arbitrarily or not at all... [They] do not seem to have improved
underlying conditions of discrimination and hatred and, in some of the
countries, may have justified inattention to those conditions.
I would only add the possibility that such laws might also exacerbate
hatred either through their discriminatory application or, more generally,
by validating the right to deem another's speech and beliefs unaccept-
able, thereby creating a divisive chain reaction. British blasphemy laws
clearly stirred a negative reaction by privileging one among a number of
communities. Europe's hate speech codes have not stopped a rising tide
Court of Human Rights, ACLU INT'L CIIL LIBERTiEs RPT., Mar. 1996 (citing
Glimmerveen v. Netherlands and X v. Federal Republic of Germany as the European
precedents for allowing restrictions on hate speech). See also Otto Preminger Institut
v. Austin, in which the European Court of Human Rights overturned the European
Commission of Human Rights and held that it was not a violation of freedom of
expression for the state to seize and forfeit a film "in the public interest" due to its
ridicule of Christianity. See 15 HuM. RTs. L. J. 372 (1994).
206. See Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), reprinted in 15
HUM. RTs. L. J. 361, 369 (1994). It should be noted, however, that the court seemed
most concerned with free press and the fact that Jersild did not associate himself with
the point-of-view of the interviewees. Id
207. See Wimgrove v. United Kingdom, Eur. Comm'n H.R., Application No.
17419/90 (finding admissible, without prejudging the merits, another blasphemy case
involving the British film Visions of Ecstasy).
208. Sandra Colliver, Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?, in ARTICLE 19, STRiK-
ING A BALANcE 363 (1992).
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of racist xenophobia. India's laws against inciting communal violence
seem only to have stimulated more communal riots."° Finally, Iran's
treatment of its minorities, despite (or, perhaps, partly because of) its
active campaign to buffer itself from insulting expression, is senselessly
bloody.1
Restrictions on expression which are justified using Article 20 must
be based on direct incitement, not more far-reaching and ultimately
counterproductive notions of "libeling" a community. Words can hurt
and words do have consequences. Except at their extremes, however,
such words are most effectively and appropriately sanctioned in the
political sphere. Civil speech is a result of a tolerant civil and political
culture which encourages restraint and politically sanctions offenders.
In the case of The Satanic Verses, the legitimacy of literary expres-
sion firmly within most countries' " boundaries of reasonable dis-
course, but regarded as communal libel by many Muslims and by Iran's
government, ultimately becomes a question of cultural relativism. Are
these two contrasting reactions reconcilable, or are they indicative of
fundamentally clashing world views that are bound to conflict in the
legal, political, and moral orders?
D. OTHER RELEVANT ARTICLES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PoLmcAL RIGHTS
Before considering cultural relativism more fully, it is worth examin-
ing several other ICCPR articles and their implications, if any, for the
Rushdie affair. The banning of The Satanic Verses is the Iranian
Government's clearest human rights violation, although even this can be
questioned given the above discussed consideration of Article 20's hate
209. See Anthony Chase, "Pakistan or the Cemetery": Muslim Minority Rights in
India, B.C. TrmD WORLD LJ. 16 (1996) (examining the targeting of Muslims in
India and the efficacy of human rights or minority rights in providing protection from
political scapegoating).
210. See Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic
of Iran By the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr.
Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1993/41 [hereinafter Final Report] (giving
details of persecution of Bahais and others in Iran). In regard to apostasy, Pohl
reported that "the sports monthly Farad was banned on charges including apostasy
after accusations that the magazine had insulted Islamic society for having published a
caricature of a football player which allegedly resembled the late Imam." Id. The
magazine's editorial chief, Mr. Nasser Arabha, and its designer were arrested and are
reportedly awaiting trial. Id. The magazine's premises were burned by a mob. Id.
211. Including, within these countries, most non-Muslims and many Muslims.
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speech prohibition. Beyond the book's banning, the fat'a's death sen-
tence remains a mere threat to a person outside of Iranian enforcement
jurisdiction, which gives rise to some ambiguity as to whether it con-
stitutes a violation of human rights.
One can also argue that by condemning Rushdie as an apostate, the
fatwa violates his non-derogable rights of freedom of thought and reli-
gion under Article 18. In the U.N. Human Rights Committee General
Comment on Article 18 it is specified that:
the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entails
the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including, inter alia, the right
to replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheis-
tic views .... Article 18(2) bars coercions ... including the use of
threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-
believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations"
The fatwa, and more generally the crime of apostasy, represent a
gross violation of Article 18, which specifically safeguards the right to
either convert to another religion or to atheism, and prohibits the use of
coercive state action against apostates.
Similarly, Rushdie's Article 14 right to a fair trial has also been
grossly violated. Furthermore, if Rushdie, or a person who facilitated the
work of Rushdie, is murdered as a result of the fatva's death sen-
tence,"' the murder will constitute a violation of the Article 6 right to
life if the assassin is an agent of the Iranian Government, or acts with
the assurance that he or she can return to Iran and avoid sanction.
There are two difficulties that need to be confronted before making
such sweeping condemnations of Iran. First, the term "threat," to which
the Human Rights Committee refers as justifying an accusation of a
human rights violation, even when an actual act violating such a right
has not occurred,2 14 must be defined. The language of the ICCPR indi-
212. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
No. A/48/40, Annex VI, General Comment No. 22, Article 18. at 208-09 [hereinafter
General Comment 22].
213. See Bedford, supra note 159, at 66 (recounting that Rushdie's Japanese trans-
lator, Professor Hitoshi Igarashi, was stabbed to death on July 11, 1991). A spokes-
man for the Pakistan Association in Japan says "the murder was completely, 100
percent connected with the book ... Today we have been congratulating each other.
Everyone was really happy." Id.
214. See General Comment 22, supra note 212, at 209 (referring to Article 18(2)
which bars coercion by acts and threats of force) (finding that coercion and threats of
penal or physical force are enough for a violation).
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cates that a violation occurs only when the prohibited act (i.e., the arbi-
trary taking of life, suspension of free expression . . . ) takes place.215
There is nothing to indicate that a "threat" by itself constitutes a viola-
tion. As used in the General Comment, "threat" refers to an immediate
threat in its reference to physical force (i.e., an immediate threat of
torture). The reference to penal sanctions, however, is less immediate,
and seems to go to the more general obligation to ensure rights. Thus, a
law prohibiting a guaranteed right is a violation even though it remains
a mere threat until the legal process has run its course. The law's exis-
tence is evidence of an intent or "threat" not to ensure the right and is
therefore a violation in and of itself. Though the notion of "threat"
appears ambiguous, in the Rushdie affair the judicial and extrajudicial
threats made against Rushdie clearly show the intent not to ensure the
rights guaranteed by the ICCPR.
E. THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION
The second difficulty in condemning Iran is one of jurisdiction. If
human rights regard a state's domestic jurisdiction, not its interstate
relations, how can the fatwa constitute a violation? Sian Lewis-Anthony
argues that, in regard to hearing individual petitions,"1 6 the Human
Rights Committee "has tended to adopt a broad interpretation of the
territorial requirement, so that it will regard persons as victims who are
not actually living within the territory of the State concerned at the time
of the alleged violation." The Committee has stated that "subject to its
jurisdiction" refers to the relationship between the individual and the
state concerned, and not to the place where the violation occurred.217
The state party thus has the obligation to maintain these rights in all of
215. ICCPR, supra note 25, add. 4.
216. Under the Optional Protocol, which Iran has not adopted, an individual can
submit petitions alleging human rights violations to the Human Rights Committee. The
procedure does not extend the definitions of rights guaranteed in the ICCPR, but
provides a procedure for implementing them. Struggling with the need to implement
such rights, however, has compelled interpretations which more precisely define these
rights; such definitions logically extend to the entire treaty.
217. Sian Lewis-Anthony, Treaty-Based Procedures for Making Human Rights
Complaints within the U.N. System, in GuiDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE 43 (1992) (referring to Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No.
52/1979, reprinted in I Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
Doc. No. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985)).
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its actions, whether internal or external, if it is claiming jurisdiction, as
Iran is over Rushdie.
Realistically, however, this argument is a stretch if it asserts that
human rights violations can be claimed for state actions which cross
borders in any but the most particular cases. One soldier shooting a
person in another country has not violated that person's human rights,
he or she has committed a violation of the traditional law of nations
which justifies reprisal and even war. Iran's actions, except for the Arti-
cle 19 violation, are more simply seen not as a violation of the
ICCPR-which as a human rights instrument deals fundamentally with
actions of a government toward those subject to its jurisdiction-but
under the more traditional principles of international law and its funda-
mental norms of territorial integrity of states and limits to enforcement
jurisdiction.
The essential question is one of jurisdiction. Iran sought to extend its
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction beyond the boundaries defined
by international law. To call the fatwa a human rights violation could
have unfortunate implications. Iran's violations of human rights (with the
exception of the banning of The Satanic Verses) can only take place
after a breach of territorial integrity. To speak of them in terms of hu-
man rights violations is to concede that Iran has jurisdiction to violate
these rights. It does not. The principle of territorial integrity is funda-
mental and is expressed in many instruments, including the U.N.
Charter's Article 2. The criteria for jurisdiction are concisely stated by
Louis Henkin:
[w]hatever happens on the territory of a state is of that state's primary
concern (the territorial principle). A state also has a significant interest in
exercising jurisdiction over persons or things that possess its nationality
(the nationality principle) and in protecting its nationals (the protective
principle). And, finally, certain activities are so universally condemned
that any state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat them
(the universal principle)."'
The universal principle is limited to acts such as piracy, the slave
trade, hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and terrorism? '9 The protective
principle applies to "certain conduct outside a [state's] territory by per-
sons not its nationals which is directed against the security of the state
218. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNAInONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 823
(1987).
219. But see AL RUBiN, THE LAW OF PIRACY (1988) (arguing that the universal
principle applies only to hijacking and, possibly, terrorism).
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or a limited class of other state interests." ' This is limited by a con-
dition of "reasonableness." "A limited class of other interests" has been
taken to mean crimes committed against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of that state." Clearly, neither of these are relevant
justifications for Iran.
The question remains of what to do about these violations of both
treaty-obligated human rights within Iran, and of customary and treaty-
based international law. The international distribution of power is such
that the treaty monitoring body cannot-and was never intended
to--enforce compliance with the ICCPR within Iran, despite its viola-
tions in the Rushdie affair, as well as in many other incidents. The
Human Rights Commission has already established a Special Rapporteur
on Iran. The Rapporteur has issued reports, but has had very little suc-
cess in changing Iranian behavior, or in even gaining access to Iran.2"
Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has reviewed, somewhat criti-
cally, Iran's periodic reports. Most recently, the Human Rights Commis-
sion condemned Iran for its human rights violations.' This too, has
had little immediate impact. Nonetheless, supplying information on the
Rushdie case to the Special Rapporteur and the Committee as a way of
building international pressure on Iran could have some long term ef-
fects. This is particularly the case given Iran's increasing ac-
knowledgement of the necessity of ties to the rest of the world, and its
statements that it sees no contradiction between human rights and Islam-
ic law. 4
220. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 402(3).
221. Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Harvard Research in International Law,
29 AJIL Supp. 437-47 (1935).
222. Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran By the
Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo Galindo
Pohl, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/23 (1987), revised by Final Report, supra note 210. A new
rapporteur visited Iran in the fall of 1995.
223. U.N. Rights Panel Declines to Censure China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at
A5.
224. See U.N. Press Release, HR/3215 (quoting a statement by Iranian Ambassador
Siroius Nasseri that "Iran felt that the Covenant and the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights were compatible with Islam"); see also A Clash of Cultures, supra
note 4 (providing details of Iran's rather ambiguous rhetorical relationship with the
principles of human rights instruments).
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F. INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF BREACHES OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
Breaches of territorial integrity and its limits on enforcement jurisdic-
tion, however, are clearly more fundamental violations of the internation-
al order's norms. It is these jurisdictional issues that have created the
strongest response. One of Khomeini's goals was to isolate Iran as much
as possible and rebuff its connections with the rest of the world. One
can speculate that this was one of his motivations in issuing the fatwa;
if it was, paradoxically it may have had the opposite result. The rest of
the world cannot separate itself from this affair, if only for the simple
reason that Rushdie is a citizen and resident of Britain, and has transla-
tors and publishers around the world who are also threatened in the
fatwa. It is these violations and threatened violations that have brought
on the traditional international enforcement mechanism, the powerful
reciprocal response of members of the international community.
The various responses, though weaker than they would be if a vital
interest was at stake, and if Iran did not represent strong trade potential,
have had an effect. While in the short term they may have caused a
backlash, the long term interest of Iran is to modify its practices in
order to ease these continued economic and political pressures. In a
sense, the international system, in a rather diffuse and uncoordinated
manner, and only within its limited sphere, can "guard the guardians" by
using the fruits of peaceful coexistence and commerce as a carrot and
club to enforce its order. While the Rushdie affair may fade in impor-
tance, it still looms heavy over Iran's relations with the rest of the
world. There is no doubt that, without it, these relations would be far
smoother and more productive.
IV. CULTURAL RELATIVISM
There is one additional human rights argument which can be made
against Iran's actions in the Rushdie affair. While Iran can invoke Ar-
ticle 20 of the ICCPR as a justifying counterbalance to its Article 19
violation, Iran can also be accused of violating Article 20 by inciting
violence against Rushdie based on religion. Khomeini's fatwa can logi-
cally be read as an incitement to hostility and violence based on "reli-
gious hatred." The General Comment on Article 20 specifies that this
Article applies "whether such propaganda or advocacy has aims which
are internal or external to the State concerned."' The actual deed in
225. See General Comment 11, supra note 185, at 10.
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question took place in Iran, indicating there is no jurisdictional barrier to
its application. What makes the accusation of an Iranian violation of
Article 20 a peculiar argument is that this article is directed against
incitement of "discrimination, hostility, or violence" toward groups of
people, not a single individual such as Rushdie. 6
Such a hate speech argument also returns us to the question of cultur-
al relativism.' Can non-Muslims really understand the anger a book
such as The Satanic Verses can cause? If not, can it expect an Islamic
legal system to conform to international norms? As earlier seen in
Allemang's argument, some believe these two orders are distinct and
irreconcilable.' An absolutist principle of cultural relativism, however,
ignores the profound degree of interaction among societies. Only a very
few isolated groups can realistically claim any sort of cultural purity.
The Islamists of the Iranian revolution, for example, integrated socialist
and republican (Islamic "Republic") elements into their ideologies at the
same time that they vehemently decried the "West." 9 Cultural relativ-
ism also ignores the extreme diversity within civilizations. For example,
Iranian Shi'as' religious practices are quite distinct from those of Sunnis
in Morocco. In fact, even within Iran and Morocco, there are any num-
ber of cultural groups who share Islam as a faith, but still maintain the
distinctiveness of their particular religious practices.
It is also true that for many Muslims around the world, the practice
of Islam has been syncretic in that it has adopted elements from differ-
ent schools of Islam, local cultural and religious practices, and other
religions. The lack of a church hierarchy in Islam has encouraged this
fragmentation, which once led to muftis of major schools and sects in
most major cities, with individuals able to selectively choose which
mufti might be most appropriately approached on a particular subject.
226. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 20(2).
227. Hate speech as a topic brings together legal concerns over individual and
minority rights, cultural relativism, identity issues, and political issues of how to best
craft a functioning civil society. Many of these issues have only been skirted in this
article.
228. Allemang, supra note 62.
229. See DABASHI, supra note 10, at 7 (providing a history of the cultural and
ideological intersections which informed the Iranian revolution). Ali Banuazizi notes
that Islamic activists in Iran before the revolution used human rights language and
arguments against the Shah's regime. Human rights only became "relative" once these
activists came to power. Ali Banuazizi, The Cultural Context of Human Rights and
Civil Society in the Middle-East, Lecture at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy (Mar. 27, 1996).
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Even within the various schools, there are distinct threads which permit
different interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunna. In sum, there is no
monolithic, pure Islamic tradition that is absolutely distinct from the
diverse traditions which coexist within the international legal order.
Indeed, there are many devout Muslims who see no contradiction be-
tween their faith and the struggle to incorporate human rights principles
into the political systems in which they live.
On the other hand, some have used this fragmentation in the Islamic
world to justify a principle of absolute universalism, i.e. that a particular
thread of Islam is always reconcilable with international human rights
law and, thus, there is no opposition between the two.' This too is
impossible to sustain, particularly in the face of powerful sources and
norms of legal authority which buttress themselves on the power of the
divine word and its threat of damnation and promise of salvation. A
reading of Islamic law that does not have resonance among a broad
group of Muslims may well be an academically valid starting point for
an alternate vision of the Islamic world. But although* no society is
static, and change in any direction is possible, such a human rights
discourse supported by a lonely reading of Islamic law is not going to
convince a believing Muslim, or a Muslim who believes in a particular
cleric's authority to represent divine law, that a particular faaa is ille-
gitimate. The Islamic world may be diverse, but there are certain norms
of authority and interpretation which are broadly shared. Certainly it is
hard to sense the popular resonance of calls for radical reform, no mat-
ter how eloquently made." A necessary prerequisite of a functioning
legal order is that individuals accept its basic legitimacy and authority.
For many Muslims, particularly within the Iranian domestic political
sphere, neither the ICCPR nor a novel reading of Islamic law is compe-
tition for an Ayatollah's version of Islamic law.
230. See Riffat Hassan, On Human Rights and the Qur'anic Perspective, .
ECU NCAL STUD. 19 (1992) (stating that "the Qur'an is not biased against woman
and does not discriminate against them . . . [b]ut [that] the interpretations by men
have distorted the truth almost beyond recognition"). Male or female, it seems diffi-
cult not to recognize as discriminatory clear Qur'anic directives that men have twice
the inheritance rights (Sura 4:11), an "edge" in legal standing (Sura 2:228) and twice
the legal weight as witnesses (Sura 2282).
231. See ABDULLAI AHamED AN-NA'I, ToWARD AN ISLAmiC REFORtATION:
CwIVL LMERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Syracuse University
Press 1990) (providing a brilliant analysis of contemporary Islamic law). John Voll's
foreword says "this book provides the intellectual foundations for a total reinterpreta-
tion of nature and the meaning of Islamic law."
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Only with the unequivocal secularization of divine origin legal sys-
tems would such contradictions be entirely effaced. Such an absolutist
universalizing project will, as a matter of course, founder on the rocks
of political resistance. Most dangerously, such a project can stimulate
this resistance, benefiting those most intent on emphasizing political and
cultural opposition.
The coexistence of a distinct system of Islamic law with general
international law is more likely to succeed if the structural similarity and
complementary nature of Islamic and international law are recognized.
Though quite distinct, each has a diffuse, nonhierarchical character, and
each, frankly, is partial and fragmented. Substantially, Islamic law is fo-
cused on instance law and matters of individual conscience, while ne-
glecting comprehensive codifications of broader categories of law. The
bulk of international law focuses on such broad areas as the Law of the
Sea, laws of commercial transactions, or other far-reaching areas of
regulation and "unavoidable cooperation" that have few counterparts in
divine origin Islamic law."2 Structurally, international legal norms have
broad legal force, but in many instances this depends on interrelating,
interacting, and working with domestic legal systems. Each order shares
a fundamentally decentralized structure which is shown most clearly by
the absence of a central, hierarchical enforcement system. This structural
similarity and distinct substantive focus help reconcile international
norms with much of Islamic law.
In addition, even when treating the same subjects, Islamic and inter-
national norms are more complementary than conflictual. First, the un-
derpinnings of many Islamic norms-for example, norms of the
bindingness of treaties or the right to self-defense-are quite similar to
those of international law. Second, when not absolutely compatible with
a domestic or international order, there are modes of accommodation in
the Islamic system to reduce tension. An example is with the general
acceptance of the territorial integrity of states in the dar al-Harb (and in
the dar al-Islam, though this is more often challenged). Third, it is only
with human rights law, which like Islamic law focuses on the individual,
that the two orders have conflicted in any serious manner. The religious
and legal norms of these two orders, however, allow for considerable
ambiguity and interpretation, particularly given Islamic and international
232. There are some, for example, the Islamic ban on usury and interest has had
an impact--quite minor, in fact-on international (or, at least, interregional) com-
merce.
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law's diffuse character, which allows a plurality of valid interpretations
to happily coexist 3
Extreme readings, implicit in any natural law order, may arise which
contradict the other's norms. In neither case, however, are such extremes
in their respective legal tradition's mainstream. By working to emphasize
complementary norms and to penalize these extremes when they arise,
such extremes will be difficult to sustain, no matter how acute the polit-
ical and social tensions from which they arise. Nonetheless, one must
recognize that the potential for such extreme interpretations exists in any
natural law order and that denying this possibility is both unrealistic and
impractical. It is unrealistic in that it ignores the very real power of, for
example, contemporary Islamist politics. It is impractical in that a rejec-
tion of religion's power will only tend to exacerbate the alienation and
estrangement that fuel the most extreme of such movements. Coexis-
tence will come only with a recognition of the differences which make
such extreme interpretations possible, and a recognition that such differ-
ences are not insurmountable.
The universalism vs. cultural relativism debate is quite charged, but
also somewhat sterile. In order to advance this debate, it may well be
necessary to move beyond these categories, questioning the validity of
each and hoping to create a new paradigm. The universal validity of
international legal standards, for example, clearly has limits. While one
may speak of a general consensus on the understanding of the content
of a core of rights, even these rights are somewhat shifting. It is far
from clear that such a general consensus is an expression of acceptance
of fundamental natural rights, or simply the result of particular political
projects which have had a remarkable degree of success, due to numer-
ous factors.
Cultural relativism is perhaps even more questionable, serving as the
meeting place of political apologists for oppressive state actions, and
romantics longing to preserve cultures which no longer exist, and proba-
bly never have. Human rights apply to states. States are not cultures.
For example, accepting for the sake of argument that a practice such as
female genital mutilation is intrinsic to particular cultures, such a prac-
233. As an example of this, one might note the analogous roles of muftis and
publicists. Rather than a hierarchical court defining law, muftis and publicists each
serve as diffuse interpreters (and creators) of law within their respective orders. Also,
through jitihad it is possible for mujtahids to follow equally valid procedures but
attain different results. Even contradictory conclusions, however, are each considered
literally true-a true pluralism within a supposedly narrow-minded theological system.
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tice is not a state activity (unless it is practiced in state hospitals), and
there is no sanction from human rights law for such practicesY 4 Indig-
enous and minority cultures are, in fact, being oppressed and destroyed.
Most often, however, it is states that are the destroyers and it is often
human rights law which provides the only protection (admittedly insuffi-
cient) from the more blatant acts of cultural destruction. The universalist
language of human rights is something of a bogeyman, conjuring up
images of a far more ravenous creature than the rather limited, circum-
scribed body of rights which-beyond certain rhetoric-have actually
been given effect by the international community. By seeking a language
to express such rights without rhetorically posing a threat to cultural
diversity, one will better succeed in pushing forward human rights while
making clear the limits to its ambitions.
CONCLUSION
A spiritual order's balance with temporal power is always delicate,
but is one that has often been successfully negotiated such that religious
law legitimates, anchors, and enriches a domestic legal order without
dominating or perverting it. A spiritual order's balance with secular
international law and human rights norms is also quite delicate. The
merging of Iran's religious and political orders under Khomeini, for
example, permitted a particularly extreme reading of Islamic law to gain
unchecked power. This legal reading proceeded to challenge many of the
established norms of the international order. In so doing, it illustrated
the deep integration of religious motifs into contemporary law and poli-
tics. Religion can infuse law and politics with a resonance and power
that cannot be ignored.
The Rushdie affair, however, is a case study of the difficulty of ex-
tending unchecked power amid the disciplinary realities of the interna-
tional order. Iran's difficulties in maintaining its defiance of the interna-
tional order show the slow but effective force of this order's reciprocal
enforcement mechanism. Iran is feeling this pressure despite the fact that
the international community has reacted in a rather half-hearted and
unsympathetic manner to Rushdie's predicament. With more pressure
from the international community, it is possible that Iran's difficulties
will be transformed into substantial change in Iran, both in terms of
Rushdie and, more unpredictably, the larger political scene.
234. Although one could use the tripartite structure of respect, protect, assist and
fulfill to argue for state responsibility.
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The Rushdie affair is often seen as an example of the incompatibility
of the Islamic and international legal orders. In fact, by giving Islamic
law the respect of a close study of its legal precedents for Khomeini's
fatwa, one can show that the fatwa's legitimacy is questionable from
within the Islamic legal tradition, in a manner that makes clear the
compatibility of Islamic and international law. Any notion of an inevita-
ble "clash" between these orders is contradicted by their cultural, legal,
and political imbrications. The structural similarity between these two
orders and their history of coexistence make a complementary relation-
ship the norm. Such a norm, however, does not negate the ever present
implicit potential for eruptions of tension and conflict between a reli-
gious natural law order and the positive, secular international order. The
extraordinary complexity of the interaction between these orders is well
illustrated by the Rushdie affair, which both embodies the potential for
clash and conflict, and the necessity of emphasizing norms of coexis-
tence and cooperation.
